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The primary objective of this study is to explore the complex nature of 
supplemental appropriations.  A supplemental appropriation is an additional funding after 
a regular appropriation.  Many aspects make up the supplemental.  The content and dollar 
value will vary from year to year and the properties of a supplemental are different from a 
regular appropriation both in purpose and process. 
The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a two-step strategic 
approach to appropriations.  The two-step process goes back to before and after the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (BCA).  It is the business 
of the United States President to request and the Congress to appropriate monies from the 
United States Treasury to an Agency to meet the needs of the country.  Since the 
constituents’ voices and therefore, their requests are many, there is the standard problem 
of having insufficient resources to meet all the needs.  When the funds run out in the 
regular appropriation, the second step is to ask for more money.  A supplemental 
appropriation meets that need.  Furthermore, it may become necessary to request more 
money for unanticipated situations.  Increasingly, the supplemental has been used with 
the emergency designation.    
There is little documented study of supplemental appropriations either for the 
DoD or for other agencies of the federal government.  However, the use of defense 
supplementals has become a way of life to conduct emergent, critical operations in the 
name of national defense.  With the extensive use of supplementals to provide funding 
for operations, we must better understand how the supplemental purpose and process 
affects the Department of Defense (DoD) in their quest to meet the mission needs as set 
out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy Document 
(NMSD). 
More specifically, this research seeks to determine whether or not the DoD really 
use the two-step process for funding their mandates and missions.  Since the NSS and 
NMSD are financially unconstrained documents and there can be many mission needs, 
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resources must be allocated as effectively as possible to meet the threat.  While that is 
addressed in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the 
supplemental process is not discussed.  However, almost every year since 1974, when the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was enacted, there has 
been a Defense supplemental.  Apparently, supplementals play an important part in 
funding defense activities and therefore, a better understanding of the issues in a 
supplemental become necessary. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main question of this research is to determine if the appropriation process is a 
one or two-step process.  The two-step process originates in a problem where a 
continuing budget need is under-funded in a regular appropriation bill and then additional 
funds must be requested in a supplemental to make up the shortfall.  This may be the 
result of deliberate strategic planning or that previous under-funding triggered an 
emergency need.  In the deliberate strategic planning scenario, the regular appropriation 
is under-funded below the amount requested.  Then, the additional funds are requested in 
a supplemental to recoup them.  In the second scenario, funds that are continuously 
denied weaken the DoD’s ability to maintain readiness and infrastructure.  Such a 
condition may require that emergency funding be provided to fix past deficient spending 
to maintain readiness and infrastructure.  Of course, emergency funding could be a result 
of an actual emergency condition such as a natural disaster.  To better answer this 
question, the impact of the supplemental appropriation must be evaluated.  A 
supplemental should provide additional funding for emergency and contingent 
operations, but this work will look at various pieces of the supplemental to understand 
their true nature. 
To begin, we must understand some of the legal aspects of budgeting in Congress.  
Congress should provide space for supplementals in the Concurrent Resolution of the 
Budget (CRB), which is required by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974.  There is some doubt as to whether or not that has been accomplished.  
Furthermore, this study will be impacted by the lack of a CRB for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999.   
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The originator of the supplemental affects its content.  The Agency (via the 
President) or Congress may initiate the supplemental.  It is necessary to know who was 
the originator of such funding and then what was the outcome.   
The designation of the supplemental is important.  An understanding of the use of 
the “emergency” designation in the legislation has a direct impact on spending limits.  
This may be a result of political or dire-needs and its concept must be explored.  Since 
supplementals may turn out to be non-emergency, this study will also examine what the 
DoD may have paid for that was not congruent with the DoD mission. 
Of course, the budget is a planning device.  However, in this complex world, the 
international dynamics are in a continual state of flux.  Emergent military missions are 
part of the DoD’s business.  While maintaining readiness is important, the DoD is used as 
an extension of political need and to maintain stability to meet United States national 
interests and security.  The level to which additional funding is necessary is determined 
partly by incremental costing.  The incremental costs not funded must then be absorbed 
in the regular budget.  Therefore, incremental costing is explored also. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis is the historical examination of the supplemental 
appropriations from fiscal year 1996 to 2000.  The study stops before 2001 because of 
changes in the global environment.  The global fight on terrorism is a major strategic 
change for the military forces and the massive dollar amounts involved in supplemental 
appropriations since the attacks of September 11, 2001, may have skewed the results of 
this study.      
This study describes the content of a supplemental appropriation.  It will look at 
the legal constructs as well as the unintended contents.  This includes an analysis of the 
meaning of incremental costing, an analysis of emergency and non-emergency 
expenditures and an analysis of policy and other factors that may affect the content of the 
supplemental appropriation.  A year-to-year comparison will be conducted to better 
understand these aspects. 
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While the scope of this study will not analyze the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS), it should be understood that the PPBS and supplemental 
processes might not be completely independent. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study addresses supplemental appropriations.  It will be broken into four 
areas of emphasis after this chapter, including (1) an overview of the supplemental, (2) 
data from the studied fiscal years, (3) an analysis of data, and (4) the conclusion. 
1. Overview of the Supplemental 
This section will discuss some of the research and studies completed prior 
to this thesis.  It will explain some of the terms used in the legislation as well as the 
possible intentions of a supplemental.  Finally, it will provide a historical backbone of 
trends in the supplemental for the 1990s. 
2. Supplementals by Year 
This section will provide data for analysis of supplemental appropriations.  It will 
be divided by year to include FY96 to FY00. 
3. Analysis of the Supplemental 
This section will analyze trends in the data.  The analysis will specifically look at 
properties of a supplemental as discussed in the introduction and overview of the 
supplemental in chapter two.   
4. Summary and Conclusion 
A final section will be dedicated to the summary and conclusions of the 
supplemental appropriation.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
Governmental budgeting is a process of planning future expenditures to provide 
for federal programs.  Events are planned for and then executed in a two-phase process.  
[Ref. 7:p. 2]  However, unseen events may deplete regular appropriations prior to the end 
of the fiscal year.  When those unknown events occur, additional funds may be necessary 
so that an agency can continue to operate for the fiscal year.   
If an agency requires more funds in a program, it must reprogram funds from one 
account to another.  Not withstanding the transfer limitations, the transfer of funds may 
result from three reasons.  First, the amount planned for may have been insufficient.  The 
assumptions or rates used in calculations for the preparation of the budget may have been 
invalid or inadequate.  Second, assuming that the proposed amount is sufficient to cover 
the budget, the President or Congress may not fully appropriate the need.  For instance, 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) performs budget estimates using their 
assumptions and the end result may suggest that the agency may not need all of the funds.  
It is also possible that the President or Congress may decide that fully funding a program 
is not justified.  It may be possible for the program to survive with less.  Third, due to 
unforeseen events, a need may arise where more resources are needed to deal with a 
contingency.  These events may be due to natural disasters such as a flood or hurricane, a 
civil disturbance or international problems such as NATO or UN demands like those in 
Kosovo or East Timor in 1999.   
A closer examination of the shortfall is necessary.  Not having planned correctly 
for routine operations is the fault of the organization.  While that is a problem, it is a 
technical calculation issue not directly addressed in this research.  The second and third 
points however pertain to planning budgets and the strategy and politics associated with 
them.   
Supplemental appropriations have been used for a long time and for many 
reasons.  Christopher Wlezien suggests that supplemental requests have been requested 
for six reasons:  budgetary growth, the onset of war, strategic under-appropriations, 
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transition in executive branch administrations, shifts in the composition of Congress and 
finally, elections cycles.  [Ref. 21:pp. 57-64]  However, this work looks at a short time 
period in hopes to filter out most of those components and focus strictly on strategic 
under-appropriation.   
As Wlezien indicates, appropriations behavior had previously been a two-stage 
process.  [Ref. 12:p. 43]  In his study of the 1951 – 1985 period, prior to the enactment of 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (DCA), budget strategy 
comprised of Congressional strategic under-funding of the regular appropriations.  Then, 
in the second step, the additional funds would be requested in a supplemental.  The 
regular appropriation was under-funded because it was known that additional funds 
would be obtained in the supplemental.  There is no way that mandatory services could 
be stopped.  In this way, Congress could appear to be fiscally responsible and provide 
funding to the many agencies, but then give more money to the organizations that 
required more funding.   
After the DCA of 1985 passed, Wlezien suggests that the two-step process 
disappeared and that the appropriations process became a single step process. [Ref. 12:p. 
45]  The DCA deficit reduction and sequestration process, in a sense, imposed fiscal 
responsibility.  It is suggested that budgets would be planned accordingly and that no 
funds would be asked for except in an emergency such as war or disaster.  Also, 
unexpected results in economic conditions such as higher than expected inflation or rising 
unemployment would require additional entitlements to be paid to beneficiaries in 
mandatory programs.  [Ref. 20:p. 59]     
While the above reasons for a supplemental are many, there are properties of 
supplemental, which must be analyzed.  A supplemental comes in many forms and can be 
fit into legislation at any point.  In its simplest form, it can show up in a separate bill for 
appropriating money in addition to funds already appropriated for a given fiscal year.  
The money can show up in a regular appropriations bill.  The appropriate bill can take the 
form of an omnibus appropriation or perhaps the additional spending is included in a 
single appropriation.  Table 2.1, provided by CBO, lists the supplementals of the 1990s 






Table 2.1. Laws in the 1990s that Provided Supplemental Appropriations or 
Rescissions.  From:  [Ref. 4:pp. 8-9] 
 
The supplemental can also be studied from different perspectives.  The funds can 
be divided into mandatory or discretionary programs.  Another perspective is defense 
versus non-defense.  Furthermore, funds can then be designated as emergency or non-
emergency.   
Of course, there is concern as to whether or not a supplemental is composed of 
pork barrel spending.  This may be the fall out in the quest to classifying funds in the 
realm of emergency versus non-emergency as well as discretionary versus mandatory. 
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When a supplemental is debated in the federal arena, there are further 
consequences that result.  For instance, funding is restricted by prior public laws.  
Legislation such as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 place limits on spending.  Consideration must be 
given to the rules of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO).  PAYGO requires that new, direct 
spending to be offset with rescissions or to be paid for with new taxes.  The net change in 
the budget must be zero.  Another legislative limit is the discretionary budget caps as 
established in the BEA of 1990 and the BEA of 1997.  In this case, discretionary 
spending may not go above a pre-determined level.  While there are control limits in 
place in an attempt to force fiscal responsibility, there is also a safety valve, which may 
permit the control and enforcement legislation to be circumvented from their original 
purpose.  It should be noted that war times and poor economic periods are exempt from 
spending limitations, as are emergency designated appropriations.   
Ultimately, there are many reasons for a supplemental.  Those reasons are 
indicative of the properties the supplemental has inherited and that those properties are 
natural in federal budgeting.  The properties of the supplemental are what makes it 
possible for it to serve as the second step in a two-step appropriation process.     
B. PURPOSE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
A supplemental appropriation is intended to provide additional funding to 
government agencies or programs when the regular appropriation will run out before the 
end of the fiscal year.  The reasons for a supplemental may be quite broad.  However, 
some reasons come about from events such as a crisis or natural disaster.  In the DoD, 
such matters could arise from domestic or international situations such as civil 
disturbance, hurricanes, floods or a change in magnitude of a mission.  For instance, the 
1999 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 106-31, provided for funding to the 
DoD in three sections of the act.  Title I was designated for general emergency 
appropriations while Title II was designated for national security emergency 
appropriations.  Title III was designated for supplemental appropriations that were non-
emergency in nature.  Appropriation categories that received additional funding were 
Military Personnel (MILPERS), Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA), Procurement, and Military 
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Construction (MILCON).  More specifically, some of the money went to paying for some 
of the damage from Hurricane Georges and contingent peacekeeping operations in 
Bosnia.  The scope of the FY99 supplemental however included much more.  Other 
executive agencies received money and some rescissions and offsets were implemented.  
The scope of a supplemental act can be broad.   
To introduce the scope of the supplemental it is necessary to get an overview of 
the total dollar value.  Figure 2.1 is the historical supplemental spending profile 
commencing in 1970 and presented through 2000.  The top graph indicates the 
percentage of the federal government’s total budget authority for the given fiscal year 
associated with supplemental appropriations.  The bottom graph indicates the total 
supplemental budget authority in billions of dollars for the applicable fiscal year.     
Even though supplementals can serve a wide range of needs, their intent is to fund 
emergencies or unforeseen events.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
directs that every effort should be made to execute programs within appropriated amounts 
and that agencies should postpone activities that require additional funds.  [Ref. 21:pp. 
110-1, 2].  However, if funds should be necessary for the current fiscal year, then a 
supplemental should satisfy one of the criteria that follow:      
• Existing law requires payments within the fiscal year (e.g., pensions and 
entitlements) 
• An unforeseen emergency situation occurs (e.g., natural disaster requiring 
expenditures for the preservation of life or property) 
• New legislation enacted after the submission of the annual budget requires 
additional funds within the fiscal year 
• Increased workload is uncontrollable except by statutory change 
• Liability accrues under the law and it is in the Government's interest to 





Figure 2.1 Supplemental Spending Gross and Net of Rescissions, 1970-2000 (By 
Fiscal Year).  From:  [Ref. 4:p. 4]   
 
In addition, amounts requested should conform to presidential policies.  [Ref. 
21:p. 30-2]  Therefore, the OMB has established guidelines for the use of supplementals 
and their span of applicability goes beyond just emergencies, but includes other 
unforeseen events such as inadequately anticipating higher cost of entitlements.   
12 
Supplemental appropriations come in many forms.  The three typical divisions are 
discretionary versus mandatory, defense versus non-defense, and emergency versus non-
emergency.  Discretionary versus mandatory is presented in this section.  The other two 
categories will be represented in the following appropriate sections.   
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 present discretionary and mandatory programs 
respectively.  [Ref. 4:pp. 14 and 20]  They represent how supplemental funding was 
divided by sub-committees and agencies in the 1990s and do not consider offsets or 
rescissions.   
Figure 2.2 plots the total budget authority in billions of dollars for the 1990s and 
was formulated from data provided in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.  This figure represents the 
division of supplementals into discretionary and mandatory accounts.  Supplementals 
have been mostly discretionary in nature.  CBO states, “almost 92 percent of the 
discretionary supplemental spending enacted between 1991 . . . and 1999 was designated 
as emergency spending.  [Ref. 4:p. 19]   
13 
 




































Figure 2.2. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Supplemental Spending in the 1990s.  From:  
[Ref. 4:pp. 14 and 20] 
 
Discretionary funding can be subdivided into the following three categories: 
defense, international, and domestic.  Figure 2.3 represents this division of needs.  
Essentially every year has each of the three categories.   
Defense will be discussed in depth in subsequent sections, however, defense 
supplementals were “intended primarily to bolster defense readiness and pay for 
peacekeeping missions . . . .”  [Ref. 4:p. 17]  CBO goes on to discuss the needs met by 
the international and domestic categories.  International funding provided support to the 
new independent states of the former USSR, international natural disasters, and finally 
economic support to foreign countries.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) received most of the funds intended for domestic reasons including the 
downtown Chicago floods, Hurricane Hugo, and the Mount St. Helens Eruption.  [Ref. 
18:p. 11] 
Generally, Congress cannot control mandatory funding because of entitlement 
legislation.  For instance, The Food Stamp program was under-appropriated due to 
“changes in participation rates and worse-than-predicted economic conditions.”  [Ref. 
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4:p. 18]  Other programs receiving funds included the unemployment insurance trust fund 
and the veterans’ compensation programs. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Discretionary Supplemental Spending, by Category, 1981-2000 (By Fiscal 
Year).  From:  [Ref. 4:p. 17] 
 
Finally, as McCaffery suggests, supplementals are highly symbolic because they 
show a rapid response to a current year crisis.  [Ref. 8:p. 18]  For example, the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States resulted in an immediate response 
from the federal government.  $40 billion was appropriated one week later in response to 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.   
C. DEFINING EMERGENCY AND NON-EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTALS 
As discussed in a previous section, the OMB recommended five criteria to use the 
emergency designation because of legislative requirements established in the DCA and 
the subsequent BEA.  However, the PAYGO requirement can be circumvented by the 
“safety valve” implemented in the same legislation by using the emergency designation.  
The OMB attempted to define an emergency as a necessary expenditure, sudden, urgent, 
unforeseen, and not permanent.  [Ref. 4:p. 19 and 21]  However, these suggested 
guidelines have not been implemented in any other legislation.  Thus, a historical 
evaluation of the use of the emergency designation has been necessary in order to 
understand what emergency may mean.  As Godek concluded for sound budgeting 
reasons, “it is imperative that Congress exercise good budgetary discipline regarding 
emergency supplemental appropriations.”  [Ref. 3:p. 44]  The void of any additional 
guidance of emergency funding requires an understanding of past uses. 
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The OMB has defined emergency appropriation as “an appropriation that the 
President and the Congress have designated as an emergency requirement.  Such 
spending is not subject to the limits on discretionary spending, if it is discretionary 
spending, or the pay-as-you-go rules, if it is mandatory.”  [Ref 22:p. 18]  Such rules are 
set in the DCA of 1985, which also requires that legislation include the standard 
“emergency clause” in order for the safety valve to be utilized.  However, as discussed 
earlier, no specific guidance provides a definition of “emergency.”   
To introduce the emergency spending amounts, the CBO has provided historic 
information by breaking it up into the following three categories:  type of spending, type 
of appropriation, and type of designation.  Figure 2.4 plots emergency spending from 
1991 to 2000.  The data for FY00 is incomplete and should be ignored in this immediate 
discussion due to the publication of the report prior to the end of FY00.  However, it is 
evident that emergency spending spans the range of approximately $5.1 billion to about 
$45.8 billion.  [Ref. 5:p. 4] 
The emergency designation has a use in both regular and supplemental 
appropriations.  Therefore, an emergency appropriation is not synonymous with 
supplemental appropriation.  The “emergency” designation is only a means to circumvent 
the fiscal limitations enacted by both DCA Acts I and II and the subsequent BEAs.  The 
actual applicable bill probably has more to do with the timing of the requested funds and 
this will be discussed in the process of the supplemental.  However, large amounts of 
emergency money can be stuffed into a regular appropriation.  Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm in 1991 designated funding as an emergency.  About $44.8 billion was 
enacted in a supplemental bill, but $1.0 billion was delivered by regular appropriation.  
[Ref. 18:p. 8]  By the end of the decade, regular appropriations contained much more 
emergency designated funds.  The 1999 Omnibus Appropriation Act contained more than 
$21 billion in emergency spending.  Therefore, the use of the emergency designation 




Figure 2.4. Emergency Spending by Type, 1991-2000.  From:  [Ref. 6:p. 5] 
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The more important issue in studying the supplemental will be to determine how 
much of the funding is emergency versus non-emergency.  CBO points out “emergency 
spending and supplemental spending were closely aligned through most of the 1990s.”  
[Ref. 4:p. 19]  However, not all supplemental spending is an emergency.   
In non-emergency supplementals, discretionary spending cannot go over the 
spending caps and mandatory programs must be offset under the PAYGO rule.  There is 
little budgetary space between budget proposals and the designated spending caps.  
Therefore, non-emergency funding must be offset.  Figure 2.5 indicates that non-
emergency spending is almost always offset with rescissions and usually with more than 
what was required.  The solid line represents the net change in non-emergency spending.  
This is determined by deducting rescissions from the new budget authority.  The net 
change added to the budget authority for the fiscal year up to that date must remain under 
the discretionary budget cap.  Between 1994 and 1999, some emergency supplementals 
were offset to various degrees even though it was not required.  [Ref. 4:p. 22] 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Total and Nonemergency Supplemental Spending Net of Offsetting 
Rescissions, 1990-2000 (By Fiscal Year).  From:  [Ref. 4:p. 21] 
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D. SUPPLEMENTALS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DoD Components normally do not budget for contingency operations . . . . 
Therefore, DoD Components must accomplish directed contingency 
operations using funds available to the cognizant command or unit, 
independent of the receipt of specific funds for the operation.  [Ref. 14:p. 
23-1] 
As Figure 2.4 depicts, emergency funding in the 1990s was a mixture of defense 
and non-defense funding.  Interestingly, the defense spending usually accounts for less 
than half of the emergency spending from year to year.  It is reasonable to assume that 
supplementals are comprised of emergency funding and therefore, they warrant further 
discussion.  Recall that supplementals are not the same as an emergency appropriation as 
the “emergency” designation may be used in either a regular or supplemental 
appropriation.  The discussion in this section will focus on the broad scope of the 
supplemental and therefore, not entirely on emergency funds.   
Table 2.2 indicates that the DoD had about $77.1 billion throughout the 1990s.  
Supplementals ranged from a low of $1.037 billion to a high of $43.579 billion for an 
average of $7.707 billion per year.  However, the high value is a result of the Persian 
Gulf War in 1991 and heavily influences the average.  By visual determination, it is 
apparent that a more normal amount in a supplemental was about $2 billion annually.  
Why were these public funds necessary?  A look at the funding levels and the needs are 
discussed next. 
The Department of Defense planned its defense programs by using threat-based 
assumptions.  Furthermore, there have usually been more threats than funds to execute all 
the programs.  As CBO indicates, there is a funding imbalance between the “sustaining 
budget” and the “actual budget” and that the sustaining budget is always higher.  [Ref. 
16:p. 15]  For instance, the appropriation for National Defense (Budget function 050) was 
$289 billion, but that the sustaining budget estimate was $340 billion for FY00.  This 
imbalance is a result of constrained resources (money) to fund desired activities.  Also, it 
should be noted that the sustaining budget was based on the DoD funding activities for 
baseline operations.  Baseline operations are those which are required to maintain 
readiness of the given force structure size established, fund research and development, 
and finally, maintain military facilities and housing.  This difference establishes that there 
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is already not enough money for the fiscal year when the regular appropriation is enacted.  
Perhaps a supplemental is necessary to partially pay for the imbalance to just maintain the 
baseline costs of the military. 
Perhaps the defense supplemental is for the necessity to pay for contingent 
operations.  The United States Code defines contingency operations as:   
A military operation that (A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as 
an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become 
involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of 
the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in 
the call or order to . . . members of the uniformed services . . . during a 
war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.  
[Ref. 15] 
Financial Management Regulations in the DoD have defined a contingent 
operation as:   
The support for peace operations, major humanitarian assistance efforts, 
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and international disaster 
relief efforts.  [Ref. 14:p. 23-1] 
To put the meaning of contingency operation into perspective, it may be better to 
understand more broadly what the term contingency operation has come to mean.  In the 
1990s, contingent operations have resulted from peacekeeping activities.  Some 
peacekeeping operations took place in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, and former 
Yugoslavia (Bosnia/Kosovo).  These “peacekeeping” operations were broadly defined by 
the United Nations as those that “promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities 
for peace,” while DoD “categorizes peace operations among its ‘operations other than 
war’ [OOTW].”  [Ref. 23:pp. 1-2] 
Supplements are probably a matter of necessity to the DoD.  Without them, 
funding would not be available to deal with contingent operations.  The incremental costs 
of contingency operations may drive the supplemental or perhaps, it may be the budgeted 





E. DEFENSE AND INCREMENTAL COSTS 
The DoD uses incremental costing to track costs above baseline operations and 
these costs have been tracked since the beginning of the 1990s.  It may have been 
necessary to start this because the BEA of 1990 coupled spending caps with the PAYGO 
rule and the subsequent sequestration process if any spending caps were violated.  Of 
course, if a sequestration is ordered, essentially no new budget authority is issued and 
then the DoD would be required to reprogram by default.  The way to get around the 
sequestration would be to use the “emergency” designation in appropriations legislation.  
If it can be justified that the incremental costs are a contingent or emergency operation, 
then more funds may be appropriated at the expense of increased public debt.   
Many defense operations in the 1990s were designated as contingency operations.  
From a financial management perspective, the terms must be defined clearly.  The DoD 
states that “the cost associated with contingency operations are limited to the incremental 
costs of the operation,” and that incremental costs are the “costs that are above and 
beyond baseline training, operations, and personnel costs.”  [Ref. 14:p. 23-6]  The DoD 
Financial Management Regulation (FMR) goes into extensive detail to define an 
incremental cost.  The FMR not only explains general parameters of incremental costs, 
but it provides fine details.  Examples of general parameters of incremental costs include 
the following:  Does not include the cost of property or services acquired by the DoD that 
were paid for by another agency; Does not include investment costs; It does include 
fixing deficiencies that were necessary to support the contingency operation that would 
not have been incurred otherwise.  [Ref. 14:pp. 23-17 and 23-18]  Other examples of 
incremental costs are provided by the FMR including the following:   
• Military entitlements such as premium pay, hazardous duty pay, etc. over 
and above the normal monthly payroll costs 
• Overtime, travel and per diem of permanent DoD civilian personnel in 
support of a contingency 
• Transportation costs of moving personnel, material, equipment, and 
supplies to the contingency or contingency staging area 
• Cost of increased flying hours in excess of the level of flying hours 
otherwise programmed and budgeted for, except that, in the case of 
humanitarian assistance operations undertaken under the authority of 10 
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U.S.C. 2551 or similar authority, all flying hour costs shall be included for 
all flights made for the primary purpose of providing the humanitarian 
assistance 
• Service specific costs for increased OPTEMPO, such as steaming costs for 
the Navy 
Assumptions determine cost by using historic rates and quantities, but in defense, 
planning is only the first step.  The execution phase can be much different because of 
contingent operations.  Additional Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs caused by 
increasing ship steaming hours or aircraft flying hours may result in increased funding to 
accomplish new missions that were not anticipated.  Also, Military Personal (MILPERS) 
pay obligations should increase for possible additional special or incentive pays.  It 
should be apparent that any military operation above baseline activities requires 
additional funding. 
Peacekeeping operations have a cost that can be traced back to their associated 
operation.  However, these costs were not categorized until starting in the 1990s.  [Ref. 
23:p. 6].  These contingent costs have been classified as DoD incremental costs for 
United States international peace and security commitments.  Many of these incremental 
costs can be tracked to multi-year operations.  For example, four of the seven operations 
in the 1990s took place in Southwest Asia totaling $9.070 billion dollars through mid-
FY01.  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]  All of the 1990s through mid-FY01 saw a total of $29.301 
billion in incremental costs.  Finding a bill payer is the next logical step.   
While identifying the bill payer, there is an interim means of providing funds to 
pay for the additional missions.  The Navy Flying Hour program is a good example.  
Money is reapportioned from fourth quarter operations budget to the operating quarter in 
need.  At some later point, flying hours are reduced in order to “fly to the dollars,” money 
is reprogrammed between accounts, or some mixture of the two.  [Ref. 7:pp. 431-433]  
“Fly to the dollars” means fly less or stop flying certain squadrons.  A second option is to 
reprogram between accounts.  This is possible multiple times through the fiscal year as 
long as the transfer limits of reprogramming are adhered to.   
After the interim stopgap, a means to ultimately pay for the increased 
requirements must be found.  There are two basic options in order to pay for these 
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activities.  The first is to absorb the new mission or operation requirements into the given 
budget.  The second option is to request additional funding.  The first option has already 
been discussed to a degree.  The reapportioned and reprogrammed funds become 
permanent.  The later execution of programs is either not possible or some other program 
cannot completely operate to the budgeted level.   
The second option, to request additional funds, is the purpose of the supplemental.  
It pays for the incremental costs associated with conducting contingent or emergency 
operations.  Those roles of these missions derive additional costs that go beyond the 
funding in regular appropriations.  
While the DoD would like to get additional funding for all contingencies or 
unplanned higher costs, that is not always reality.  For instance, in preparation for the 
mid-year review of the FY02 O&M, Navy appropriation, the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations distributed an early warning memorandum.  “Funds available to solve 
problems identified during the mid-year review will be extremely limited, therefore 
claimants should have plans in place to execute programs within the resources currently 
available to them.”  [Ref. 17:p. 1]  The same memo suggests that only operations that 
pertain to war will probably be funded by supplemental appropriation.  “Any 
requirements addressing the cost of war should be clearly and separately identified.” 
Finally, while money can be appropriated to the individual service accounts such 
as Military Personnel, Navy (MPN), three other accounts have come into creation in an 
attempt to deal with the defense supplemental.  The three accounts are the following: 
Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF); Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer 
Fund (OCOTF); Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Fund (OHDACA).  
Money may be appropriated into any of the three defense-wide accounts.  The money is 
designated for specific contingencies and in some cases the money is designated for 
specific service accounts.   
DERF was established in 1989 by Public Law (PL) 101-165, the 1990 Defense 
Appropriations Act.  It is available to fund Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) 
and Foreign Disaster Assistance.  [DoD Directive 3025.1-M, June 1994, p. 13.]  The 
Secretary of Defense may use the funds for immediate action prior to a formal request 
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from other federal departments and agencies and from state and local governments for 
assistance.  The money would remain available until it was expended.  It was initially 
funded with $100 million to budget for contingency operations.  However, based on the 
$7.7 billion annual supplement for the 1990s, $100 million may be considered to be 
insignificant.   
PL 104-208, the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, established 
OCOTF in 1997.  Its initial funding was approximately $1.140 billion and was to pay for 
contingent operations.  The money was available for transfer to other O&M accounts and 
it would lapse when the normal appropriation account lapsed.  The OCOTF account also 
received funds in FY98 thru FY01. 
The 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act also established the third 
account OHDACA in 1997.  This appropriation code also received funding from FY98 
thru FY01.  It was originally funded with $49 million and would lapse at the end of the 
fiscal year.  The programs eligible for the funding are defined in the United States Code.  
Examples of how this funding could be used include the following:  medical and dental 
care, rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities, detection and clearance of 
landmines.  [Ref. 24] 
F. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION PROCESS 
Budgeting turns out to be an incremental process, proceeding from a 
historical base, guided by accepted notions of fair shares, in which 
decisions are fragmented, made in sequence by specialized bodies, and 
coordinated through repeat attacks on problems and through multiple 
feedback mechanisms.  [Ref. 13:p. 62]   
1. History 
Prior to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (BCA), 
asking for supplementals was typical of the government.  Ever since the first Congress in 
1790, supplemental appropriations have been used in federal spending.  [Ref. 4:p. 1]  
Over the last two centuries, legislation has attempted to control spending.  In 1974, the 
BCA was a mechanism to control the planning process.  Furthermore, the control of 
supplementals became more formalized.  Supplementals were to be incorporated into the 
President’s budget request by including an allowance for the anticipated supplemental.  
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[Ref. 4:p. 2]  However, this is difficult to do.  With so many needs and the presence of 
constrained resources, it may be too difficult to fund a buffer account.   
Recall that when DERF was initially funded for FY90, it was only $100 million 
or about 1.3% of the average annual supplemental.  That appeared to be a token deposit 
for this regular appropriation account that had not been funded for the previous 16 years.  
Of course, those funds would not lapse and were open to obligation in any future years.  
Other accounts have been established since DERF.  For FY97, the OCOTF and 
OHDACA were established in the DoD annual appropriation act.  However, these two 
regular appropriations appeared to be stashed with funds that were already designated for 
contingent spending and had to be used within a designated time period.   
Finally, with a safety valve in place to over-ride budgetary spending caps and 
deficit controls, it appears that there is no need for a buffer account.  The emergency 
designation in the legislation will make it possible to override previous fiscal planning.  
In a manner of speaking, the regular appropriation could become a budget buster by the 
simple act of adding a supplemental to the fiscal year with no offsets or rescissions.   
There is an acknowledgement that spending contingencies occur, but the funding 
is just enough to meet the legislative requirement.  Indeed, additional funds are necessary 
to stock these accounts.  Not all the funding comes from the regular appropriation and 
thus, additional funds are still required in a supplemental. 
2. Basic Process 
A supplemental proposal generated by the agency is sent to OMB for 
consideration.  Then, “requests that are known at the time the budget is prepared and 
approved are normally transmitted to Congress with the budget, rather than later as 
separate transmittals.”  [Ref. 22:p. 30-2]  It will then take OMB and the White House no 
less than three weeks to consider proposals for supplementals or amendments that are not 
transmitted in the annual budget. [Ref. 22:p. 110-2] 
There are two ways that the President can adjust the budget.  First, a supplemental 
is requested for the current budget year in which an appropriation bill has already been 
approved.  Second, an amendment could be sent to Congress for the budget year being 
debated, assuming that the President’s Budget (PB) had already been transmitted to 
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Congress.  [Ref. 22:p. 110-1]  Proposed revisions must conform to the President’s 
policies.  In general, the OMB directs that every effort should be made to postpone 
actions that require a supplemental.  However, if a supplemental is proposed, the agency 
should “submit proposals that decrease or eliminate amounts whenever such changes are 
warranted,” such as offering offsets or rescissions.  [Ref. 22:p. 110-1]   
The military does not use the same PPBS system as used in the appropriation 
process for supplementals.  There is no planning necessary because, conceptually, 
supplemental funds cannot be planned for.  They are in response to emergent needs at the 
moment because of some crisis or disaster.  So, while planning for funds in PPBS begins 
almost two years in advance, supplemental funds must be provided for quickly.  
McCaffery states that supplementals pass quickly relatively to regular appropriations.  
[Ref. 8:p. 5]  Data from 1974 to 1999 from Godek support this.  [Ref. 3:p. 34]  As 
determined by McCaffery, about 44% of the supplementals were introduced and enacted 
in two months and 80% of them in four months.  This is shorter compared to the ten 
month, or greater, regular appropriation as stated by McCaffery. 
3. Initiating Emergency Spending  
The President or Congress may initiate emergency spending.  When Congress 
initiates emergency bills, the funding is designated “contingent”.  Finally, when the bill 
becomes public law, the funding is officially designated “emergency.”  Both Congress 
and the President must agree to designate funding as emergency.  Figure 2.4 illustrates 
this property.  At the time the updated CBO memorandum, Emergency Spending Under 
the Budget Enforcement Act, was published in June of 1999, FY00 had not begun, but 
money had been designated and no appropriation had been signed into law yet.  The 
earliest appropriation for FY00 was the MILCON bill in August 1999.  [Ref. 1,1999:p. 2-
4]  McCaffery computed that Congress originated about 33% of the emergency 
designated funds in the 1990s.  [Ref. 8:p. 4]   
Figure 2.4 also shows which appropriation process was used to gain emergency 
funding.  Funding either came from the regular or supplemental appropriation process.  
As the middle bar graph shows, emergency spending usually is delivered by 
supplementals; however, the regular appropriation also serves as a method of delivering 
emergency funds.  In 1999, the use of the regular appropriation to deliver emergency 
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funds was used extensively and accounted for more than half of the emergency spending 
for the year.   
4. Non-Emergency Offsets 
Non-emergency appropriations are required to be offset by some means.  If no 
rescission of prior budget authority is recommended, then a violated budget cap causes a 
sequestration of funds.  It is an agency’s responsibility to recommend offsets to the 
President to prevent sequestration because it would be an undesirable event.   
The Congress may accept or reject the President’s proposed rescission and 
Congress may initiate its own rescissions.  In every year of the 1990s, except 1991, 
Congress exceeded the President’s recommended rescissions and most of the rescissions 
were discretionary in nature.  [Ref. 4:p. 11]  As CBO indicates, rescissions enacted 
totaled $52 billion.   
The DoD is not exempt from the offset requirement.  As McCaffery suggests, 
each service component must share the burden of the offset equally.  [Ref. 8:pp. 10-11]  
He goes on to further state that while this may seem fair, it really is not a fair practice 
because generally the supplemental is not shared equally.  Therefore, some services 
benefit and others will lose net funding.   
G. SUMMARY 
The supplemental appropriation is a complex appropriation.  It can be studied 
from many perspectives, which include discretionary versus mandatory, defense versus 
non-defense, and emergency versus non-emergency.  Furthermore, the process is 
different and generally, rescissions must be considered.  It can be studied from the 
political aspect too by looking at which government entity initiates the proposals.   
The need for a supplemental may result from two possibilities.  It could be a 
budget strategy, namely strategic under-funding as defined by Wlezien, or it could be due 
to a funding imbalance.  Specifically for the Defense function, “there has been a gap in 
the military requirements established to combat threats and the amount of funding 
available.”  [Ref. 16:p. xiv]  In order to reduce this “imbalance,” requirements would 
have to be lowered, funding would have to be increased, or a mixture of the two.  The 
supplemental is a method in which defense may gain additional money.  Another issue is 
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that defense could be intentionally under-budgeting a regular appropriation and then 
funded additional amounts to complete basic military functions.   
Incremental costing is essential to understanding how defense is budgeted and 
how the supplemental affects defense.  Since it is generally accepted that federal 
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III. SUPPLEMENTAL BY YEAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The government was composed of a Democratic President and a Republican 
Congress from 1996 through 2000.  During the five-year period, eight supplemental 
spending appropriations were distributed in three different types of appropriations.  They 
were distributed into three stand-alone supplementals, three omni-bus appropriations, and 
two regular appropriations.   
During the period, the DoD was continuously involved in peacekeeping 
operations in two major geographic regions.  The first region was Iraq in Southwest Asia.  
The second region was the former country Yugoslavia.  Within the former Yugoslavia, 
United States Armed Forces were in Bosnia and Kosovo.  Iraq and Bosnia had been 
ongoing operations since the early 1990s.  However, by fiscal measures, action started in 
Kosovo in FY99.   
Regular and supplemental spending paid to support these missions.  Data were 
collected on both appropriations and incremental costs for the Defense function during 
the 1996 through 2000 fiscal year period.   
Table 3.1 lists the supplemental appropriations for the fiscal years 1996 through 
2000.  It provides the short title as enacted and the public law number.  Data in future 
tables and text will refer to public law numbers only.   
 
  Public   
Fiscal Law  
Year Number ShortTitle (enacted) 
96 104-134 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations and Rescissions Act of 1996. 
96 104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997. 
97 105-18 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from Natural Disasters, and for 
Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts, Including Those in Bosnia. 
98 105-174 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act. 
99 105-277 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999. 
99 106-31 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. 
00 106-246 Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000. 
00 106-259 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001. 
   
  Note:   There may be more than one short title (as enacted) for a public law. 
 
Table 3.1. Public Laws with Defense Supplemental Funding.  From: [Ref. 25] 
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    FY96 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY99 FY00 FY00 
Public Law No. 104-134 104-208 105-18 105-174 105-277 106-31 106-246 106-259 
Introduceda 3/5/96 6/11/96 6/12/97 3/27/98 7/24/98 3/17/99 5/11/00 6/1/00 
Enacteda  4/26/96 9/30/96 6/12/97 5/1/98 10/21/98 5/21/99 7/13/00 8/9/00 
Total Elapsed Timed 2 months 4 months 1 month 2 month 3 months 3 months 3 months 3 months 
  (Budget Authority in Millions of Dollars) 
Supplementalb 962 123 1,930 2,860 8,324 10,887 7,356 1,779 
Rescissionsb 1,032 123 1,930 0 0 31 322 0 
Net, Defense     
Supplemental -70 0 0 2,860 8,324 10,856 7,035 1,779 
     
Emergencyb 858 123 1,846 2,163 2,083 4,065 154 0 
Contingentb 0 0 0 697 6,239 6,822 6,983 1,779 
No Emergencyb 105 0 83 0 2 31 219 0 
     
% emergency 89% 100% 96% 76% 25% 37% 2% 0% 
% contingent 0% 0% 0% 24% 75% 63% 95% 100% 
% no emergency 11% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 
     
Notes:          
a Data listed in Library of Congress on-line services through the Thomas legislative website. 
b Amounts were tabulated from the applicable public law and represent enacted values only. 
 Amounts may not necessarily be obligated due to emergency designation.   
c Amounts are new budget authority in millions of dollars.    
d Time elapsed is within a period of time.      
e Some differences may be due to rounding error.         
 
Table 3.2. Characteristics of Supplemental Funding Laws.  From:  [Refs. 25, 28-35] 
 
Table 3.2 indicates the time elapsed from the time a bill was introduced to 
enactment.  Also, it summarizes the amount of the funds that went into a supplemental 
appropriation and the amount of rescissions.  The supplemental amount is further divided 
into three categories of designation.  They are further represented by the percentage in 
each category.  The three categories are emergency, contingent, and non-emergency.  
These categories indicate the intention of the both the President and Congress, but do not 
necessarily indicate what really happened to those funds.  For instance, emergency funds 
and non-emergency funds are available for immediate obligation, but contingent funds 
are not.   
When funds have been designated an emergency, both the President and the 
Congress have agreed to use the emergency designation as prescribed in the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.  In this case, the President makes a 
written request to Congress to make certain funding an emergency.  If Congress concurs 
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with the request, then a legal statement is written into the bill.  Once the law is enacted, 
the funding is designated emergency.  The emergency funding is immediately available 
for obligation.  Next, if funds are non-emergency, then the President and the Congress do 
nothing special and write the bill like a regular appropriation.  Again, the funds are 
available for immediate obligation once the bill is enacted.   
Contingent funds are different because Congress has taken the initiative in 
proposing the additional spending.  In this case, Congress writes two legal statements into 
the bill.  One statement declares that the Congress requests the funding to be eligible for 
the emergency designation.  However, the funds are not available for obligation based on 
the request from the Congress.  A second statement is written into the legislation that 
requires the President to make the funds an emergency before they are available to the 
DoD.  Then, after the bill is enacted, the funding is designated contingent emergency.  
The funds are not available for obligation until the President requests the funds for 
emergency use.  After the President requests the funds, the funding status changes from 
“contingent emergency” to “emergency” and they are available for obligation.   
The above process is a method to determine who initiated supplemental spending.  
This topic is explored in this research.  However, it will become clear that the President 
does not always accept the request from Congress.   
Next, rescissions are derived from public law and they are used to offset spending 
that would otherwise cause discretionary spending limits to be surpassed.  Rescissions 
can be used as historical fact because once the public law is enacted, the rescission goes 
into effect.  The emergency designation and the non-emergency designation also 
represent historical fact.  Those two types of funding go into effect immediately when the 
bill is enacted for the reasons discussed above.  This is not true for funding that has been 
designated contingent emergency.  Therefore, funding in public laws does not represent 
actual historical events accurately, but they do indicate intent.  A look at the CBO data 
will clarify actual historic events.  The data from CBO are similar to a financial 
workbook because the CBO documents actual expenditures and how they are 
categorized.   
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    FISCAL YEAR (Budget Authority in Millions of Dollars) 
  96 97 98 99 00 
CRB Defense Function 050i 264,700 265,583 268,200 None 288,812 
 House Versiong    270,500  
 Senate Versionh    270,500  
 Discretionary Defense Limitk    271,500  
       
Defense Regular Appropriation, Netj 264,423 264,662 267,989 270,390 286,540 
       
Total Supplementala  4,512 8,897 6,277 13,367 17,422 
Total Rescissionsa -3,844 -7,980 -2,726 -2,019 -470 
Net, Total Supplementala 668 917 3,551 11,348 16,952 
       
Defense Supplementalb 1,037 1,927 2,830 9,081 9,144 
Defense Rescissionsb -2,070 -1,928 0 -31 -322 
Net, Defense Supplementalb -1,033 -1 2,830 9,050 8,822 
       
Total, Defense Emergencyc 982 2,077 2,834 16,845 f 
Regular, Defense Emergency 0 231 0 7,796 f 
Supplemental, Defense Emergency 982 1,846 2,834 9,049 8,834d 
       
Total Number of Defense  11 15 25 95 f 
 Emergency Accountsc     
Number of Regular Defense 0 10 0 35 f 
 Emergency Accountsc     
Number of Supplemental Defense 11 5 25 60 f 
 Emergency Accountsc      
       
Total Incremental Costse 3,272 3,076 3,602 5,982 4,482 
       
Notes:      
a Source:  [Ref.4:p. 25]      
b Source:  [Ref. 4:pp. 14-16,26]     
c Source:  [Ref. 6:p. 3,10-11]   (unless indicated otherwise)   
d Source:  [Ref.4:p. 26]      
e Source:  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]      
f Data not available.  Source does not include FY00 data.    
g Source:  [Ref. 26]      
h Source:  [Ref. 27]      
i Source:  [CRB FY96-98, 00:  Conference Reports]    
j Source:  [Ref. 9:pp. 25-26]      
k Source:  [Ref. 62]             
 
Table 3.3. Summary of Fiscal Information from FY96 through FY00.  [Refs. 4, 6, 9, 







  Budget Authority (in millions of current year dollars)     
Fiscal Year DERF KEY OCOTF KEY OHDACA KEY Public Law No. 
96 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA note a 
97 0 NA 1,140 R/N/L 49 R/N/L 104-208 
97 0 NA 1,430 S/E/L 26 S/N/L 105-18 
NET, 97 0  2,570  75   
98 0 NA 1,884 R/N/L 47 R/N/L 105-56 
98 0 NA 1,814 S/E/A 37 S/C/L 105-174 
NET, 98 0  3,698  84   
99 0 NA 439 R/N/A 50 R/N/L 105-262 
99 0 NA 1,859 S/E/A 0 NA 105-277 
99 0 NA 5,007 S/E/A 38 S/E/L 106-31 
NET, 99 0  7,305  88   
00 0 NA 1,723 R/N/A 56 R/N/L 106-79 
00 0 NA 2,050 S/E/A 0 NA 106-246 
00 0 NA 1,100 S/C/A 0 NA 106-259 
NET, 00 0   4,873   56     
Note a: DERF was the only contingency account that existed at the time.  
        
KEY        
R Regular Appropriation     
S Supplemental Appropriation     
E Emergency Designation     
N No Emergency Designation     
C Contingent Emergency Designation.    
A Available Until Expended     
L Limited Time Availability     
NA Not Applicable / No Funds Provided       
 
Table 3.4. Contingency Account Funding Profile From FY96 Through FY00.  [Refs. 
28-38] 
 
Table 3.3 summaries the dollar amounts by fiscal year in the Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget (CRB), net defense appropriation (by budget function 050), 
supplemental, supplemental rescissions, and incremental costs.  The CRB data were taken 
from the concurrent resolution on the budget if available.  For instance, a CRB is 
available for each year except 1999.  In that case, the house and senate versions of the 
CRBs were provided to show a possible outcome.  However, the discretionary defense 
spending limit is provided in this case to show the statutory limiting requirement.  While 
the CRB is not legally binding, it does show the intent of Congress in the budgeting 
process and it is required to be at or below the statutory limit.  Information about the 
supplemental was obtained from CBO.  Incremental costs were provided from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).  The DoD is required to keep track of the 
incremental costs and they are tabulated by fiscal year.  There is one cautionary note 
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about Table 3.3 for FY99.  The data provided from CBO are based on supplemental 
appropriations based on its scorekeeping method.  The defense supplemental amount of 
$9,081 million for FY99 should be used with caution.  CBO does not consider the 
emergency portion of PL 104-277, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, a supplemental.  Therefore, that amount of 
$7,796 million is seen as a regular, emergency amount for FY99 in Table 3.3.  The actual 
Defense Appropriations Act for FY99, PL 105-262, did not contain emergency nor 
contingent emergency spending. 
Furthermore, Table 3.3 indicates the amounts of total emergency funding, defense 
emergency funding, and the number of defense accounts.  The number of defense 
accounts and the amounts in those accounts are further divided into regular appropriation 
or supplemental appropriation.  Emergency data are collected from CBO reports and are 
actual historical data.  The CBO report had only begun to collect data for FY00.  The 
incomplete data are discarded, as the numbers do not add any value for analysis in this 
study.  However, note that there was $1,881 million designated contingent emergency in 
ten defense supplemental accounts and most of it was for military pay and retirement.  
[Ref. 6:pp. 2, 8, 10]         
Table 3.4 documents requests for the various contingency accounts.  The data 
tabulated for contingency accounts come from a compilation of data from the 
appropriation acts.  The three identified contingency accounts are DERF, OCOTF, and 
OHDACA.  DERF was the only contingency account before FY97.  No amounts were 
added to DERF during FY96 through FY00.  OCOTF and OHDACA were created in 
1997 and have been funded every year through FY00.  They have both received funding 
in regular and supplemental appropriations.  It also indicates that the regular accounts do 
not use the emergency designation, but that the supplemental accounts do.  Also, the 
funding of these accounts is usually available until expended or beyond the fiscal year 
they are programmed for.   
The emergency designation was an interest to Congress during this period of 
study.  Appendix A provides excerpts from the CRBs for each year.  Each year, one or 
both chambers attempted to address the improper use of the emergency designation in the 
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budgeting process.  The findings are that Congress and the President misuse the 
emergency designation and that a budgeting means for emergencies should be defined.  
The findings of the Senate state that the annual emergency spending was about $5.8 
billion.  By FY2000, the Sense in the Senate was more specific about the emergency 
designation.  It provided guidance, criteria and steps of the process in the CRB.  There 
was no CRB for FY99.  The House and Senate were unable to come to an agreeable 
solution in conference even though each chamber did have their own version of the CRB.    
B. FISCAL YEAR 1996 
1. Background 
There were two supplemental appropriations for FY96 and both were passed in 
1996.  The first supplemental PL 104-134 was enacted on April 26 and the second, PL 
104-208 was enacted on September 30, five months later.  PL 104-134 was passed as a 
rider on the FY95 Omnibus Appropriations Act for five regular appropriations that had 
been the result of a budget battle.  This supplemental passed in the middle of the third 
fiscal quarter.   
2. Defense Overview for the Year 
Two major events affected most of the supplemental spending.  First, missions to 
Bosnia were expanding.  In total about 17,000 Armed Forces personnel were in Bosnia in 
support of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) that was to enforce the Bosnian 
Peace agreement.  [Ref. 2:pp 26-28]  Furthermore, it was intended that all forces would 
be withdrawn by the end of CY96.  That did not happen and a force of about 8,500 
remained for the follow-on NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) to continue a 
peacekeeping role.  The second major event was the terrorist attack against the Armed 
Forces on June 25, 1996 at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.     
Other missions and operations were ongoing during CY96 also.  Missions to 
support Operations Northern and Southern Watch continued in Southwest Asia.  Smaller 
operations occurred in Haiti, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and Zaire.  
Most missions were to protect embassies or evacuate private citizens in countries that 
were unstable.  The missions to Rwanda and Zaire were humanitarian in nature.  [Ref. 2:p 
27]   
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3. Defense Supplementals Described 
Table 3.2 describes two characteristics of the supplementals in FY96.  The first 
characteristic is the period of time it took for the bills to pass.  PL 104-134 passed within 
2 months and PL 104-208 passed within 4 months; however, the latter was part of the 
regular omnibus appropriation package for FY97.  While the supplemental in PL104-208 
was for FY96, most of the bill provided regular FY97 appropriations for departments 
such as Defense, State, Commerce, and Justice.   
Second, the amount of the combined supplemental was just over $1 billion in new 
budget authority, but it was completely offset.  PL 104-134 provided funding to 
MILPERS, O&M, Procurement, and RDTE to support operations in Bosnia at a total of 
$820 million.  [Ref. 40:pp. 553-554]  $991 million had been approved to be 
reprogrammed to cover the initial costs of Bosnia and now $820 million was being 
provided to reimburse the raided accounts.   
RDTE received $50 million to provide for additional research for Sematech 
semiconductor consortium.  As indicated by the FY96 DoD regular appropriation, 
Sematech was appropriated $39 million.  This program was initiated in prior years to 
maintain the United States technical ability to provide integrated circuits and lithography 
for support of many defense programs.  Computational modeling and simulation for 
weapons programs is one such program.  [Ref. 48]  It is not apparent that any funds had 
been specifically authorized for the program.  However, an authorization for FY96 
RDTE, Defense-wide was $9,693 million, while the appropriation was about $282 
million short at $9,411 million.  Third, about $44.9 million in additional funding went to 
the B-52H program.  The program had been appropriated $21 million for air-to-ground 
munitions integration.  Due to debates about the B-2 program, the authorization specified 
that no funds would be obligated for reducing the size of the strategic B-52 fleet.  $37.5 
million went into MILCON to fund NATO infrastructure.  The remaining $10 million 
went to RDTE, Navy for countermine warfare studies.  All of the new budget authority 
was offset with rescissions with a net offset of about $70 million in savings.   
PL 104-208 provided $123 million in funding for the MILPERS, O&M, and 
procurement accounts.  All of the supplemental went into anti-terrorism, counter-
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terrorism, and security enhancements.  An equal amount of rescissions was provided to 
offset all the costs.  After the attack on the Khobar Towers, additional funds were 
necessary to increase military posture to protect against terrorism.  The Secretary of 
Defense addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the bombing.  
While the commanders where trying to do their job, it was difficult to know what to plan 
for and they had to plan for many contingencies due to inadequate intelligence.  
Furthermore, he stated, “to deal with this level of threat will be complex, expensive, and 
take many months to implement.”  [Ref. 39]  Of the approximately $1.1 billion to better 
prepare for terrorism, about $353 million would be available for use until the end of 
FY97.  [Ref. 41:pp 769-772]  Of the $353 million, $123 million was in the supplemental 
for FY96 that was enacted in the FY97 Omnibus.   
4. Emergency Funding 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide emergency funding information.  Table 3.3 indicates 
all emergency spending in FY96 was funded by the two supplementals with 11 accounts 
used to provide the funding. 
Table 3.2 shows that 89%, $858 million, of the first supplemental was designated 
an emergency and the remaining amount had no emergency status attached to it.  The 
second supplemental of FY 96 was completely designated an emergency.  The Congress 
did not provide contingent funding to either of the supplementals.  
In PL 104-134, all of the emergency designated funds went into a NATO resource 
pool.  Most of the funds paid for NATO operations in Bosnia.  Air operations in Bosnia 
began in 1993 in support of a NATOs enforcement of the “U.N. ban of unauthorized 
military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina.”  NATO air operations continued throughout 
1994 and 1995.  By December of 1995, U.S. group troops were going to Bosnia as an 
enabling force to initiate the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996.  In 1996, the 
number of military personnel would swell in excess of 20,000 in support of operations in 
the former Yugoslavian country.  [Ref. 2:p. 24-26]   
The remaining emergency funds of PL 104-134 paid for supporting the NATO 
Security Investment Program (NSIP).  The U.S. fair-share contribution to the NSIP was 
already at the approved limit for the FY96 program.  However, as the Undersecretary of 
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Defense, Comptroller testified, the “additional funds are essential to support projects in 
Bosnia such as repair of railroads, repair and replacement of bridges, and repair and 
maintenance of seaports.”  [Ref. 51]   
All of the funds in PL 104-208 were designated an emergency.  The funds were 
necessary for an immediate response to the Khobar Tower terrorist attacks and to 
improve the military preparedness to protect against such attacks again.  As the Secretary 
of Defense stated, “whatever we do, and however much we invest in anti-terrorist 
activities, we cannot eliminate the risk . . . we have to take actions that will reduce risks 
in the future.”  [Ref. 39]  Actions to improve force protection were already being 
implemented, but different commanders were executing different programs to protect 
against terrorist activities.  These changes were being phased in because of the bombing 
of a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh in November 1995.   
5. Incremental Defense Costs 
Table 3.3 indicates the incremental costs of $3,272 million for Defense in FY96.  
These costs were due to on-going operations in Southwest Asia (Iraq) and Former 
Yugoslavia (Bosnia).  $665.2 million incremental costs were because of operations 
Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq.  Of the $2,520 million of incremental costs 
in Bosnia, $2,231.7 million supported NATO IFOR and SFOR operations that started that 
year.  The remaining $288.3 million paid for smaller missions in Bosnia.  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-
16]   
The DoD was authorized $647.1 million to be paid from regular appropriations to 
compensate for the incremental MILPERS and O&M costs associated with Operations 
Provide Comfort and Southern Watch.  [Ref. 52:pp. 242-243]  The two operations were 
fully appropriated at $647.1 million and this was in agreement with the authorization.  
[Ref. 53:p. 50]   
No budgeting plan was found for the Former Yugoslavian Operations category.   
C. FISCAL YEAR 1997  
1. Background 
There was one supplemental in FY96.  PL 105-18 was introduced and enacted on 
June 12, 1997, in the third fiscal quarter.  However, while House Resolution 1871 (PL 
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105-18) was fast to pass, the first version of the bill, House Resolution 1461 (H.R. 1461), 
was vetoed just three days earlier.  H.R. 1461 was introduced on April 29, 1997 in 
response to spring floods in the Great Plains and the Upper Midwest.  A Defense 
supplemental was also needed to cover costs from continued operations in Bosnia and 
Southwest Asia.  On June 9, 1996, President Clinton vetoed the measure claiming 
Republicans were playing politics with money that was needed for disaster relief.  Three 
days later, H.R. 1871 was presented to the President with most of the gimmicks removed.  
[Ref. 73:pp. 9-84, 9-90]   
2. Defense Overview for the Year 
Two ongoing events were the major events for the DoD in FY97.  The NATO 
SFOR was established in Bosnia to support peacekeeping efforts.  The SFOR was to 
remain in place until withdrawn in the summer of 1998.  [Ref. 2:p. 28]  Missions in 
Southwest Asia continued with Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch.  In 
addition to the large-scale operations, smaller missions took place in Albania, Congo, 
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia in support of evacuation missions of private U.S. citizens as 
well as support for security at various embassies.  [Ref. 2:p. 28] 
3. Defense Supplemental Described 
Table 3.2 describes the Defense portion of the FY97 supplemental.  The vetoed 
bill took two months to process, but the new bill was processed within a single day.  The 
supplemental contained $1,930 million in new budget authority for the DoD.  An equal 
amount of rescissions were issued for a zero net change in the defense budget.   
The additional funding was for seven programs.  First, $1,774 million, 92%, of 
the supplemental was to pay for operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.  Of that 
amount, $1,430 million in new budget authority was derived from the FY97 
Supplemental OCOTF account.  The remaining new budget authority came from savings 
from various Bosnia and Southwest Asia operation reductions.  [Ref. 42:p. 72]  Second, 
the Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Fund, a revolving management fund, 
received $72 million to keep the account solvent.  The account had been started in the 
FY96 Defense Authorization to “mitigate economic losses for Reservists when 
involuntarily called to active duty,” and the “law requires a ‘special’ appropriation to 
cover any unfunded liability”  [Ref. 52:p. 34]  The program was required to be financed 
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by membership premiums.  However, program flaws from the beginning and an 
insufficient enrollment period resulted in serious under-funding.  [Ref. 55]  The third 
program that received supplemental funds was the OHDACA at $25.8 million.  The 
money was to pay a grant to the American Red Cross in support of armed forces 
emergency services.  In the regular budget process, the OHDACA had been authorized 
$54.5 million, but the FY97 Defense Appropriation provided for $49 million.   
The remaining four programs that received supplemental funding were the 
Defense Health Program, OPLAN 34A/35 P.O.W. Payments program, Defense-Wide 
force protection program, and Navy & Marine Corps Family Housing.  The largest single 
amount was $21 million for the Defense Health Program, with a cumulative amount of 
$57.5 million for all four remaining programs.   
4. Emergency Funding 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide emergency funding information.  Table 3.2 indicates 
that 96%, $1,846 million, of the new budget authority was designated an emergency.  
Congress did not designate any contingent emergency spending and therefore, the 
remaining amount of supplemental funds had no emergency designation attached to them.   
Table 3.3 indicates that there were five accounts in the supplemental with the 
emergency designation with about $1,846 million according to CBO.  However, there 
were ten accounts in the regular appropriation with the emergency designation with a 
value of $231 million.  The emergency funding in the regular appropriation represents 
11% of the total emergency designated funds for the fiscal year.   
The OCOTF and OHDACA were introduced by the government for FY97.  As 
Table 3.4 indicates, both received funding in the regular defense appropriation and were 
not emergency designated.  It was the first time defense was attempting to adequately 
fund for incremental costs while remaining within the pre-arranged discretionary budget 
limits.  However, Table 3.4 also indicates that the FY97 supplemental provided 
additional funds for these two accounts.  The OCOTF supplemental funds, $1,430 
million, were designated emergency and accounted for about 74% of the defense 
supplemental. 
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Of the seven programs, two were designated emergencies.  The largest emergency 
designated funds went to the OCOTF.  The second largest emergency supplemental 
appropriation was the Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Fund which was also the 
second largest supplemental amount in the entire bill.     
The remaining five programs did not have any emergency designation associated 
with them.  Those accounts were the OHDACA, OPLAN 34A/35 P.O.W. Payments, 
Defense-Wide counter terrorism, Defense Health, and Family Housing.  The total sum of 
these non-emergency funds was $83.3 million or 4% of the supplemental.  Not only were 
these amounts offset with rescissions, but the emergency designated amounts were 
completely offset as well.   
Within the regular appropriation, $230.7 million were designated emergency in 
ten accounts.  Those funds were appropriated for anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, and 
security enhancement activities in the DoD.  This was the second installment of 
emergency funds in response to the Khobar Towers.  The first installment was in the 
FY96 Defense Supplemental that was also contained within the same bill. 
5. Incremental Defense Costs 
Table 3.3 indicates defense incremental costs were $3,076 million.  Operations in 
Iraq totaled $793.1 million and operations in Bosnia were $2,282.5 million.  The new 
missions in Iraq cost the DoD $102.7 million.  The remainder of the funding for Iraq 
went to routine incremental costs to support Operations Provide Comfort and Southern 
Watch.  NATO SFOR in Bosnia cost the DoD $2,087.5 million for the on-going NATO 
ground presence in Bosnia that had started a year earlier.  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]   
There was no discussion in the FY97 Defense Authorization concerning funding 
for the OCOTF account nor was there discussion on how operations in Southwest Asia or 
Bosnia would be funded.  More interestingly, there was no specific line item authorizing 
dollar amounts for the OCOTF account.   
D. FISCAL YEAR 1998 
1. Background 
There was one supplemental in FY98.  PL105-174 was enacted on May 1, 1998 in 
the middle of the third fiscal quarter.  Of the discretionary amounts in the supplemental, 
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about half was for disaster relief due to winter and spring storms in the United States.  
The other half was for defense.   
2. Defense Overview for the Year 
Similar to FY97, the same two major events were on-going in Southwest Asia and 
in Bosnia.  Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch continued as before.  The 
NATO SFOR continued to operate in Bosnia even though President Clinton’s time limit 
of June 1998 expired.  Also, smaller operations such as evacuation and embassy security 
support continued.  Countries affected were Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Tanzania, Liberia, 
Afghanistan, and Sudan.  [Ref. 2:p. 29]   
3. Defense Supplemental Described 
Table 3.2 indicates that PL105-174 was enacted within two months of its 
introduction in the House.  It contained $2,860 million in supplemental funding with no 
rescissions.   
This year, the supplemental was more diversified compared to the last two years.  
First, the total amount of funds that went into contingency operations was $2,040 million 
that represented 71.3% of the supplemental.  These funds went into the OCOTF account 
and all of the MILPERS accounts and they were to be used for on-going contingency 
operations in Southwest Asia and Bosnia.  In the regular budgeting process, the OCOTF 
account was authorized $1,253.9 million.  [Ref. 56:p. 44]  Then, $1,884.0 million was 
appropriated with $213.6 million from the MILPERS and $416.5 million from the 
individual services O&M accounts.  [Ref. 57:pp. 55 and 87]  When those amounts are 
subtracted from the appropriation, the balance matches the authorization at $1,253.9 
million.  Those funds were to pay for operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.  The cost 
of Operation Southern Watch in Iraq was growing quickly.  Also, operations in Bosnia 
were funded only through June 30, 1998 as published at the end of the FY98 Defense 
Appropriation.  [Ref. 36:pp. 48-49].  Additional funds would be necessary to continue 
operations past the deadline in Bosnia.  President Clinton first hinted and then declared 
that U.S. Armed Forces would remain in Bosnia for peacekeeping efforts.   
Second, another 8.1%, $231 million, of the supplemental paid for damages 
sustained in natural disasters.  The natural disasters included Typhoon Paka that hit 
Guam, the El Nino storms on the West Coast, and the tornadoes that hit Fort Stewart, 
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Georgia.  [Ref. 43:pp. 49-52]  Several of the O&M accounts as well as working capital 
funds and the defense health program were affected by the natural disaster relief.   
Third, $273 million or 9.5% was for procuring eight F/A-18s for the Marine 
Corps.  In the routine budgeting process, the FY98 Defense Authorization included $2.1 
billion (adjusted) for procurement of twenty Navy F/A-18s.  [Ref. 56:p. 523]  The FY98 
Defense Appropriation also contained $2.1 billion for twenty F/A-18s.  [Ref. 73:p. 9-23]     
The remaining five projects represent 11% of the supplemental.  First, the RDTE 
funding (6.5%) was for theater missile defense programs.  In the regular budgeting 
process, missile defense was authorized $4.08 billion and appropriated $4.18 billion.  
[Ref. 73:p. 8-6]  The Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Fund (1.6%) required 
additional funds to pay for current and future claims while the program was terminated 
due to poor performance.  Third, OHDACA (1.3%) required additional funds to pay the 
Red Cross for Armed Forces emergency services similar to the FY97 supplemental.  
Next, the International Trust Fund (1.0%) was to de-mine in Bosnian-Herzegovina and 
pay assistance to victims of the mines.  Finally, MILCON and Family Housing programs 
(<1%) were to pay for damages sustained from natural disasters.   
4. Emergency Funding 
Table 3.2 indicates that $2,163 million or 76% of the supplemental was 
designated emergency.  The remaining 24% of the supplemental was designated 
contingent emergency.  There was no non-emergency funding in this supplemental.  
Table 3.3 indicates that all of the defense emergency spending for FY98 was contained 
within the supplemental and it affected 25 accounts.   
As Table 3.4 indicates, the two contingent defense accounts were funded in the 
regular appropriation without using the emergency designation and were to fund 
contingent operations in Southwest Asia and Bosnia.  However, the OCOTF 
supplemental was designated an emergency and it amounted to $1,814 million.  The 
OHDACA was designated a contingent emergency by Congress asking for $37 million 
more.  The purpose of this funding was discussed in the previous section.   
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Of the contingency operations, all of it was designated an emergency.  That 
included the $1,814 million in OCOTF and the $226 million from MILPERS accounts for 
a total of $2,040 million or 71% of the supplemental.  [Ref. 43:p. 48] 
$231 million provided natural disaster relief and all but one of the accounts were 
designated an emergency.  The one remaining account, O&M Defense-Wide, was 
designated contingent emergency and it represented 54% of the Defense disaster relief 
package.  That 54% was a result of the DoD providing an updated report on disaster 
spending in response to El Nino damage in California and tornado damage at Fort 
Stewart, Georgia.  Of the total supplemental, contingent emergency funds for disaster 
relief was 4.4%.  [Ref. 43:p. 48] 
Most of the remaining supplemental accounts were designated contingent 
emergency.  Those accounts were Navy Aircraft Procurement, Defense-Wide RDTE, 
Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Fund, OHDACA, International Trust Fund, and 
MILCON & Family Housing.  Some of the MILCON & Family Housing accounts were 
designated emergency because of Typhoon Paka, but the amount was less than 1%.  In 
all, 24% of the supplemental was designated contingent emergency.   
The FY98 Defense Appropriation did not contain emergency designated funds. 
5. Incremental Defense Costs 
Table 3.3 indicates that incremental costs to the DoD were $3,602 million.  
$1,639 million of the incremental costs were for operations in Southwest Asia and $1,963 
million were for Bosnia.  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]  The incremental costs for Operation 
Southern Watch more than doubled from FY97 to FY98 to a total cost of $1,497 million 
due to an increased buildup of forces in response to Iraq’s refusal to comply with arms 
inspections.   
6. Other Issues 
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted two major weapons programs 
pertinent to this supplemental.  First, while the Navy was waiting for its version of a new, 
futuristic combat aircraft, it required a better variant of the F/A-18 fighter/bomber.  The 
anticipated need was 548 aircraft with an option to buy 237 others.  Second, ballistic 
missile defense emphasized that the program had been under-funded in the past.  Now, 
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the DoD was asking to double the funds over the 1998 – 2003 period.  The review also 
concluded that the additional funding was still not enough and that there were significant 
schedule and technical risks.  [Ref. 73:pp. 8-20, 8-21] 
E. FISCAL YEAR 1999 
1. Background 
There were two supplemental spending bills in FY99.  Interestingly, the first 
supplemental could not wait to be enacted past the regular appropriation bill.  PL 105-277 
is the Omnibus Regular Appropriation bill for FY99 and is one of two emergency 
supplementals.  CBO scores the emergency funding as part of the “regular appropriations 
because it was packaged along with eight regular appropriation bills . . . .”  [Ref. 5:p. 8]  
Furthermore, in the FY96 to FY00 period, this is the only appropriation that CBO 
classifies as a regular appropriation, but most of it contains emergency intent.  [Ref. 6:p. 
12]  The emergency funding was nearly $20.8 billion for the entire government with the 
Defense portion at $8.3 billion.  For this paper, it is considered supplemental spending, 
especially because the DoD appropriation bill had passed just four days earlier without 
any emergency designated funding.   
Seven months later, the second supplemental for FY99, PL 106-31, was enacted.  
It contained nearly $10.9 billion in emergency “intent” funding.   
This year was special compared to most budget years because the federal budget 
was in surplus.  By the time the omnibus was to be enacted, “the surplus having surged to 
about $70 billion for fiscal 1998, the pressure was on to tap it for much more emergency 
spending than had previously been expected.”  [Ref. 74:p. 2-117]   
2. Defense Overview for the Year 
Major operations included the on-going NATO mission in Bosnia and operations 
in Southwest Asia.  The NATO SFOR mission to Bosnia had gone past the previous 
year’s self-imposed deadline without any immediate foreseeable withdrawal from the 
region.  A new major addition to operations was the use of U.S. Armed Forces in another 
region of the former Yugoslavia.  NATO had taken a new mission in Kosovo to help the 
plight of the ethnic Albanians in March of 1999 starting with air strikes.  By the end of 
1999, there would be about 8,500 U.S. military personnel, including ground troops, in the 
region in support of the NATO Kosovo Security Force (KFOR).  [Ref. 2:p. 30-31]  Also, 
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by October of 1999, the U.S. military would be providing aid to the U.N. multi-national 
operation to commence a U.N. peacekeeping role.  It was expected that the U.S. Armed 
Forces would be withdrawn after the U.N. was set up and the situation had been 
stabilized.   
3. Defense Emergency Supplemental Described for PL105-277 
To begin, Table 3.3 shows the total defense supplemental at $9,081 million and 
that information comes from CBO.  The amount provided in Table 3.2 shows values for 
both supplemental amounts in FY99.  The amount of PL 105-277 on Table 3.2 is not 
included in the FY99 value of Table 3.3.  I suggest that caution should be used in 
classifying PL105-277 as either a supplemental or a regular appropriation.  Again, for 
this study, it is considered supplemental spending even though CBO considers it regular 
spending.  This is further supported by the CRS designating the defense portion of the 
emergency spending as a supplemental.  [Ref. 9:p. 26] 
Unlike FY96 when there were two supplemental appropriations, there were at 
least some non-emergency designated funds.  This fiscal year was different and will be 
easier to discuss in one section as most supplemental spending is an emergency.    
Table 3.2 indicates that PL105-277 passed within three months in the first fiscal 
quarter of FY99.  There were eleven general programs in this emergency-spending 
package.  From highest to lowest funding amounts, they are the following:  OCOTF, 
Readiness, Year 2000 computer infrastructure, ballistic missile defense, former soviet aid 
to purchase uranium and plutonium, counter-terrorism, facilities repair due to natural 
disaster, anti-terrorism focused on weapons of mass destruction preparedness, MILCON 
due to natural disaster, Defense Health, and counter-drug operations.   
All $8,323 million of the first Defense supplemental was designated with 
emergency intent except for $2 million.  Next, Table 3.2 indicates that 25%, $2,083 
million, of the supplemental was emergency designated.  It went to costs for Bosnia and 
natural disaster damage both domestically as well as internationally.  75% of the funding 
was designated as contingent emergency and it covered a variety of needs.  Due to 
rounding, the Table indicates 0% non-emergency funding, but this was not true.  There 
was $2 million in funding for the Fisher House.  This was the lowest funded amount in 
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the entire emergency bill and it had not been included in the FY99 Defense Appropriation 
except for stating that funds may be derived from the Fisher House Trust Fund.  [Ref. 
37:p. 40]   
The highest funded account in this supplemental spending was OCOTF and it 
faced a complicated funding scenario.  During the appropriation process, there was 
significant concern at the Pentagon that if the funding for operations in Bosnia were not 
approved by appropriators, then spending would be reduced in the readiness categories of 
training, maintenance, and modernization.  [Ref. 74:p. 2-22]  The FY99 Defense 
Authorization Act included $747 million in regular authorization for Southwest Asia and 
then provided another $1,512 million for OCOTF specifically for peacekeeping missions 
in Bosnia.  [Ref. 63:pp. 44 and 197]  An additional $346 million was for MILPERS to 
cover peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.  The regular defense appropriation (PL 105-
262) called for $439 million in the OCOTF that was for operations in Southwest Asia.  
[Ref. 37:p. 6]  Then, four days later in the Omnibus and Emergency Appropriation bill, 
funding for the NATO missions in Bosnia was provided.  That total supplemental amount 
was for $1,859 that was all designated an emergency.  In all, the OCOTF had been 
appropriated $2,298 million in five days.   
The second largest package was for increasing defense readiness.  The regular 
appropriation had received additional funds to improve readiness, but when conference 
members learned that President Clinton was going to ask for additional readiness dollars 
in the supplemental, conference members reduced the regular appropriation readiness 
funding by $400 million.  [Ref. 74:p. 2-28]  A hearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended additional funds for readiness, otherwise the military could risk becoming 
ineffective.  [Ref. 74:p. 2-28]  Subsequently, four MILPERS and ten O&M accounts 
received funding for a total amount of $1,301 million.  All of this funding was designated 
contingent emergency. 
Third, the DoD received $1,100 million in contingent emergency money for the 
Year 2000 (Y2K) for information technology (IT) and security improvements related to 
the year 2000 computer coding issue.  Not only did this include funding for updating IT 
systems, but also critical systems were to be backed up with contingency plans.  [Ref. 64]  
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This was another program that drained funds from long-term readiness because in a “flat-
budget” environment, funds were taken away from modernization.  [Ref. 65]   
The remaining programs were identified as programs that needed additional 
funding as well.  Many of the programs had been under-funded in prior years.  For 
instance, the Ballistic Missile Defense program was identified in the Quadrennial 
Defense Review as severely under-funded.  This fiscal year, the program was given an 
additional $1,000 million in contingent emergency money.  The program was authorized 
$3,537 million.  [Ref. 63:p. 562]  The regular appropriation contained $3,450 million.  
[Ref. 74:p. 2-31]    
There were no rescissions provided in this supplemental. 
4. Defense Emergency Supplemental Described for PL 106-31 
PL 106-31 passed in just over two months midway through the third fiscal 
quarter.  It contained $10,887 million of emergency intent funding.  [Ref. 33]  Table 3.2 
shows that the funding was broken into 37% and 63% for emergency designated and 
contingent emergency designated categories, respectively.  There was $31 million in non-
emergency funding specifically for disaster relief.  There were five emergency funding 
packages in this supplemental and they are the following:  contingency operations, 
readiness, MILCON for military infrastructure in Bosnia, Central American disaster 
assistance, and MILCON for disaster relief. 
The first and largest funding package was for two contingency missions, one in 
Southwest Asia and the other in Kosovo.  Funding for the NATO KFOR humanitarian 
operation had not been provided before.  Supplemental emergency funding for the two 
geographic regions totaled $6,008 million in a myriad of accounts for MILPERS, O&M, 
and procurement.  Also, a new account called the Operational Rapid Response Transfer 
Fund was started and appropriated $300 million in contingent emergency funding. [Ref. 
45:p. 75]  Within the emergency supplemental amount, $453 million was to go for past 
operations in Southwest Asia and that included funds for replacing missiles used in the 
attacks.  Furthermore, approximately $5,000 million was to go into NATO air strikes and 
humanitarian operations in Kosovo.  Finally, another $550 million was to go into 
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procurement of missiles and bombs, some of which might be used in Kosovo.  [Ref. 75:p. 
2-159]   
The OCOTF contained $5,007 million of the $6,008 million.  Of the $5,007 
million, $3,907 million (78%) was designated emergency and was to provide for O&M in 
Southwest Asia and Kosovo.  The remaining  $1,100 million was designated contingent 
emergency.  President Clinton’s request had funded only the air war in Kosovo through 
the end of the fiscal year.  Congress determined that those funds would be insufficient if 
ground troops were sent into Kosovo and provided the contingent emergency amount.  
[Ref. 75:p. 2-159]   
The second largest funding package was for defense readiness at $4,188 million 
and it was categorized as contingent emergency.  The types of programs in this package 
were for personnel programs, spare parts, depot maintenance, base operations, readiness 
training/OPTEMPO and recruiting.   
The third largest funding package was $475 million in contingent emergency 
funding.  This funding provided for developing military infrastructure in Kosovo such as 
construction that would support mission, readiness, and force protection in the Balkans.  
[Ref. 45:p. 81]  There was debate in Congress as to whether this funding was necessary.  
Originally, $1.1 billion had been proposed in the House.  Later, after an initiative to 
remove the funding, it was decided that $475 million could remain as long as the 
Pentagon could select the most critical items.  [Ref. 75:p. 2-158]   
The remaining two packages were for disaster relief from Hurricanes Georges and 
Mitch.  The first one was for Central America where the hurricane had occurred seven 
months earlier.  The funds were split in what was designated an emergency and 
contingent emergency.  The second package was for military bases that required disaster 
relief.  The funding was designated non-emergency.     
There was only $31 million in rescissions.  That accounts for less than 0.3% in the 
new budget authority, but it offset the entire non-emergency portion of the defense 
supplemental.  All rescissions were in the MILCON accounts for 1999.  Of the $31 
million, $25 million was in savings from foreign currency fluctuations and $6 million 
from the Base Realignment and Closure Account (BRAC), Part IV.  [Ref. 75:p. 2-165]   
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5. Summary of Emergency Funding in FY99 
The amount of total defense-function emergency appropriation was $19,209 
million.  Of that amount, PL 105-277 was $8,321 million and PL 106-31 was $10,887 
million.  As Table 3.3 shows, total defense emergency spending for FY99 was $16,845 
million or 87% of the combined supplemental appropriation.  Of the $16,845 million of 
emergency spending, $7,796 million was considered to be in the regular appropriation 
process, even though it has been considered a supplemental amount for this study.  About 
6% of the funding in PL 105-277 remained designated as contingent emergency.  The 
second supplemental of FY99 provided $9,049 million in emergency spending.  About 
17% of the funding in PL 106-31 remained designated as contingent emergency.  There 
was $19 million in rescissions. 
6. Incremental Defense Costs 
Incremental costs for the FY99 were $5,982 million as indicated in Table 3.3.  For 
the year, operations in Southwest Asia and Bosnia utilized $1,261 million and $1,587 
million, respectively.  New operations commenced in Kosovo at a total incremental cost 
of $3,132 million for the year.  Finally, incremental costs for East Timor totaled $1.5 
million.  However, there was no appropriation for the operation in East Timor this year. 
F. FISCAL YEAR 2000 
1. Background 
There were two supplemental appropriations in FY00.  PL 106-246 was enacted 
on July 13 at the beginning of the fourth fiscal quarter.  It was introduced in the House as 
the Military Construction Appropriation Act for 2001 and then was amended in the 
Senate to include the majority of the defense supplemental for FY00.  Less than a month 
later, PL 106-259, the Defense Appropriation Act for 2001 was enacted into law with 
additional supplemental funds for FY00.  Overall, the federal government’s budget was 
running a surplus and much of the additional appropriations this year were funded from 
that surplus. 
2. Defense Overview for the Year 
There were three major areas of U.S. Armed Forces involvement in FY00.  On-
going operations continued in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.   
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Smaller operations were also executed.  The first was in East Timor.  The region 
had voted for independence and the U.N. committed to helping the region become an 
autonomous government.  The U.S. military was to be present until the U.N. 
peacekeeping operation was established.  [Ref. 2:p. 31]  Second, a small contingency 
operation was established for Sierra Leone.  The operation would provide logistics and 
evacuation support for the U.N. should peacekeeping break down.  [Ref. 2:p. 32]   
3. Defense Supplementals Described 
Defense supplemental spending was different this year.  Funding came later in the 
year in two separate supplemental spending packages attached to regular appropriations 
bills.  As indicated in Table 3.2, the first supplemental, PL 106-246, was $7,356 million 
and the second, PL 106-259, was $1,779 million.  PL 106-246 will be examined first. 
PL 106-246 took just over 2 months to pass.  Its main purpose was to be the FY01 
MILCON Appropriations Act, but the bulk of the FY00 supplemental appropriation was 
attached.  PL 106-246 contained supplemental funding for 20 categorized programs.  The 
top four programs are the following:  contingency operations, Defense-Wide Working 
Capital Fund, Defense Health Program, and support for deployed forces.  These four 
programs represent $5,535 or 75% of the of this supplemental.  All of the remaining 
programs are under $500 million and most are under $200 million.  Some of the 
remaining programs are a significant amount of money.  In any other fiscal year, they 
would deserve a serious look.  However, with the growing use of emergency funds, the 
top four programs should suffice to study the nature of the supplemental.  
The largest funding was for contingency operations representing $2,163 million 
or 29% of the supplemental.  It provided $2,050 million for the OCOTF, $73 million for 
Air Force aircraft procurement, and $40 million for Defense-Wide O&M.  The OCOTF 
had been authorized $1,880 million of which $1,824 million was specific for operations 
in Bosnia.  If additional funds would be necessary to cover incremental costs in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (inclusive of Kosovo), the FY00 Defense Authorization 
Act was specific to direct the President to request supplemental funds.  [Ref. 66:pp. 47, 
229-230]  The FY00 Defense Appropriation Act funded $1,773 million for operations in 
Southwest Asia and Bosnia.  The amount took into consideration the early end of the air 
campaign.  [Ref. 66:p. 157]  Aircraft procurement for the Air Force included $9,759 
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million in authorization.  [Ref. 66:p. 561]  However, the Air Force was appropriated 
$8,229 million.  [Ref. 67:p. 14]  Next, the O&M Defense-Wide had been authorized 
$11,497 million.  [Ref. 66:p. 47]  The regular appropriation was for $11,489 million.  
[Ref. 67:p. 5]  No rescissions were provided to offset these amounts.   
The supplemental funding package for the Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund 
(WCF) was $1,556 million.  In the regular budgeting process, $90 million was 
authorized.  [Ref. 66:p. 679]  $90 million was appropriated in the regular appropriation.  
[Ref. 67:p. 252]  No rescissions were provided to offset this supplemental. 
The third largest supplemental funding package was for the Defense Health 
Program (DHP).  $616 million was enacted for TRICARE and another $696 million for 
additional programs.  The total amount for DHP was $1,312 million.  In the regular 
budgeting process, $10,483 million had been authorized by the FY00 Defense 
Authorization Act.  [Ref. 66:p. 47]  The regular appropriation funded $11,155 million.  
[Ref. 67:p. 252]  No rescissions were provided to offset this supplemental. 
The fourth supplemental funding of $504 million was for support of deployed 
forces.  This funding was for several unfunded requirements and affected many accounts.  
There were four accounts in O&M at $96 million, three accounts for aircraft procurement 
at $291 million with most going to the Air Force, two for classified procurement at $54 
million, and two for RDTE at $63 million.  No rescissions were provided to offset this 
supplemental. 
In the remaining programs of PL 106-246, it should be noted that $138 million 
went to defense activities to pay for immediate and follow-up activities of the defense 
portion of the fire at Cerro Grande.  $62 million went to fund operations in East Timor 
and Mozambique.  $19 million went to MILCON in response to storm damage.   
The following accounts were not designated emergency:  Navy MILCON to 
purchase land in Florida which was offset with rescissions; The Army’s Biometrics 
Assurance Program which was offset with rescissions; The DoD mission to provide 
protection at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City which was offset with 
rescissions; The DoD mission Walking Shield which was offset with rescissions; 
Procurement upgrades for the Army’s M1 tank which was offset with rescissions; RDTE 
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for the Army for the continued development of the High Energy Tactical Laser which did 
not have any accompanying rescission statement.  The total value of these non-
emergency programs was $219 million and they were completely offset by the total 
amount of rescissions at $322 million. 
The second supplemental of FY00 is PL 106-259.  It took just over two months to 
pass.  Its main purpose was to be the FY01 DoD Appropriations Act, however, some 
FY00 supplemental appropriation was attached.  PL 106-259 contains supplemental 
funding for the following four programs:  OCOTF, Readiness, Defense Health Program, 
and Recruiting & Retention.  This is the second supplemental funding for the OCOTF, 
Defense Health Program, and Recruiting & Retention in this fiscal year.   
The OCOTF received $1,100 million.  Interestingly, the same amount was 
rescinded from the FY01 Defense Appropriation Act.  Readiness received $529 million 
in supplemental funding.  The Defense Health Programs received an additional $100 
million.  The second supplemental contained no rescissions.   
4. Emergency Funding 
Table 3.2 indicates that the $7,356 million of PL 104-246 was mostly of 
emergency intent.  $154 million was designated emergency, $219 million was designated 
non-emergency, and $6,983 million or 95% of the first supplemental was designated 
contingent emergency.  The emergency designated funds were for the DoD portion of 
counter-drug operations.  The non-emergency designated funds were discussed above.  
All of the remaining funds were designated contingent emergency and the big items will 
be discussed below.  Furthermore, all $1,779 million of the second supplemental, PL 
106-259, was designated contingent emergency and will be discussed below. 
The top five emergency funded packages, that also happen to be designated 
contingent emergency, are the following:  contingency operations, the defense Working 
Capital Funds, the Defense Health Program, readiness, and support for deployed forces.  
Combined, they represent $6,164 million or 67% of the total combined FY00 
supplemental for defense.   
Contingency operations received the highest amount of supplemental 
appropriation.  As Table 3.4 indicates, the OCOTF was funded in the regular and 
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supplemental appropriations.  Both FY00 supplementals provided contingent emergency 
funds for the OCOTF.  The first supplemental of OCOTF money was to be used to offset 
incremental costs to Kosovo.  The intent of the second supplemental amount of $1,1000 
million in the OCOTF is unclear because I was unable to find information pertaining to 
its use.  However, some of the budgeting tricks being used for the year included moving 
budget authority from the FY01 budget to the FY00 fiscal year via supplemental.  [Ref. 
68:p. 525]  As stated above, the FY01 Defense Appropriation Act had $1,100 million of 
its budget authority rescinded in OCOTF.  This may be a loose connection.  The 
additional funds were necessary though because without them, the full incremental costs 
of the overseas contingency operations would further detract from readiness. 
The second funding package is for the defense working capital funds.  The price 
for fuel went up during 1999 and 2000 and that caused insufficient funding to purchase 
fuel.  $1,556 in contingent emergency funding was enacted in the legislation. 
The third funding package was for the Defense Health Program at a total $1,412.  
That funding was split mostly down the middle between additional costs for TRICARE 
and then other programs.  The first supplemental provided funds for unfunded 
requirements in TRICARE claims from 1998 through 2000.  The second supplemental 
then provided an additional small amount for these purposes.  The other half of the 
supplemental amounts for the Defense Health Program went to other unfunded 
requirements.  All of these funds were to address the “critical shortfalls confronting the 
military health care system.”  [Ref. 48:p. 287-288]  There was a large concern about 
violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act and the GAO was directed to investigate the 
administration of those funds.  [Ref. 47:p. 132]  Half of this funding would remain 
available through the end of fiscal year 2002.   
The fourth supplemental spending package for FY00, for readiness, contained 
$529 million.  That funding was to address the unfunded requirements for depot 
maintenance, real property maintenance, and readiness spare kits.  The Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen testified that there was an “escalating criticality” for the 
supplemental because costs in Kosovo would begin to hurt readiness and damage the 
NATO mission.  Furthermore, he addressed the need for transferring funds from the 
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Navy and Air Force to maintain the Army’s scheduled training rotations.  However, he 
suggested that without timely supplemental funding, major fourth quarter baseline 
operations would be cancelled.  [Ref. 72]   
The fifth contingent emergency supplemental spending package of FY00 was for 
support of deployed forces with $504 million.  Again, this was to support unfunded 
requirements and it was discussed above in section F.3 of this fiscal year.   
The FY00 Defense Appropriation Act provided emergency funding.  There was 
$7,200 million in 11 designated contingent emergency accounts.  All accounts were in 
the category of O&M and there was an equal amount of rescission.  In fact, the shuffle 
was to keep the funding in the same projects and to include the contingent emergency 
status.   
5. Incremental Defense Costs 
The total incremental cost to defense for commitments to international peace and 
security was $4,482 million.  $1,139 million, $1,483 million, $1,803 million, and $57 
million for operations in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor respectively.  
No incremental cost data were provided for other operations in other regions of the 
world.   
G. SUMMARY 
The eight supplemental appropriations of fiscal years 1996 through 2000 have 
been presented in this chapter.  The background and defense overview were intended to 
set the stage for the purpose of the supplemental.  Next, the supplementals were 
described.  Not all supplementals have emergency designation and for that reason, they 
are described first in a monetary sense to rank them.  The dollar value may provide a 
level of importance to the supplemental spending.  The emergency funding was outlined 
separately in some years.  In other years, the emergency funding was discussed by talking 
about both supplementals together.  The purpose of this was to make it possible to study 
the emergency designation for each fiscal year.   
There is a sense that contingency operations were beginning to drive the budget 
by the scenario presented above.  Also, the earlier years’ operations and lean budget seem 
to affect readiness to the degree in which additional funds were required in the later years 
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of this study.  Many of the supplemental requests that were made during this period 
include an emergency designation.  It may also become apparent that more supplemental 
funds were designated contingent emergency.   
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IV. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Defense supplementals have been used for many purposes from fiscal year 1996 
though 2000.  However, the purpose of a supplemental is to provide additional funding 
when the regular appropriated funds are insufficient and there is an urgent need.  The 
OMB identified criteria for when a supplemental should be used.  The criteria was 
described earlier in this paper, but it is re-emphasized here as the following: 
• Existing law requires payments within the fiscal year (e.g., pensions and 
entitlements) 
• An unforeseen emergency situation occurs (e.g., natural disaster requiring 
expenditures for the preservation of life or property) 
• New legislation enacted after the submission of the annual budget requires 
additional funds within the fiscal year 
• Increased workload is uncontrollable except by statutory change 
• Liability accrues under the law and it is in the Government's interest to 
liquidate the liability as soon as possible (e.g., claims on which interest is 
payable) 
Even though the OMB identified criteria in 1991, there was a “sense” about the 
emergency designation developing in Congress.  The appendix outlines the “sense” of 
Congress as it developed from 1995 to 1999 by looking at the CRBs for those fiscal 
years.  In 1995, Congress had a sense that using the emergency designation circumvented 
the discretionary budget caps.  Both Congress and the President were responsible for this.  
However, there was no legal precedent for what defined an emergency.  The OMB 
criteria were not binding.  By the FY00 CRB, the sense of Congress defined what should 
be an emergency, but this also was not binding.  [Ref. 61:pp. 19-20]  It re-emphasized 
OMB’s criteria and it was the following: 
• Necessary, essential, or vital (not merely useful or beneficial) 
• Sudden, quickly coming into being, and not building up over time 
• An urgent, pressing, and compelling need requiring immediate action 
• Unforeseen, unpredictable, and unanticipated 
• Not permanent, temporary in nature 
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Those guidelines established by the OMB and Congress were used to establish the 
evaluation criteria in this study.  The characteristics were studied in each supplemental.   
B. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING A SUPPLEMENTAL 
To determine if a supplemental was “good,” its characteristics must be evaluated.  
Characteristics that are included in a good supplemental are as follows: 
• The supplemental was an emergency as defined below; 
• There were offsets for non-emergency designated funds; 
• Emergency designated funds should be offset to minimize deficit 
spending; 
• The response to the need was quick; 
• The supplemental amount remained below the spending cap; 
• Past contingency operations were planned for and left out of the 
supplemental; 
• Small contingent missions were not added to the supplemental; 
• Pork barrel spending was negligible. 
It will be determined if the supplementals for FY96 through FY00 met the true 
intent of an emergency.  In order to determine this, criteria for evaluation must be 
established.   
The first step is to determine if the supplemental amount was necessary.  More 
importantly, the immediate needs of the DoD must be satisfied.  This step has objective 
and subjective elements to it.  Objectively, it can be determined if some law requires an 
obligation.  Most commonly, this would take the form of an entitlement.  Subjectively, it 
must be determined if an action was required.  For instance, if no action were taken, 
would life or property be lost?  
The second step is to determine if the need for funding is sudden.  There would be 
no build up to a need.  In this case, the event could not be planned for nor anticipated.  
For example, a rusting car occurs over a period of time.  One can see it happening and 
corrective action such as painting the car can be planned for in the routine budget.  A 
sudden event does not allow one to plan or save funds for the colloquial rainy day.   
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The third step is to determine if the need is urgent.  In this case, the funding 
cannot be delayed once an emergent event has occurred.  The task cannot be 
accomplished without the resources in the immediate future. 
Fourth, once the need has been identified and action taken, it should not be a 
continuous expenditure.  It should be temporary in nature.   
Finally, the event should be unforeseen or unpredictable.  This has some 
similarities to steps two and four.  However, it is possible that a need does develop slowly 
over time and the need is not recognized.  Of course, after an emergent event has 
occurred, not all possible corrective and preventative actions may be initiated from 
preventing future events.  There may be insufficient resources to adequately respond to 
all the different contingencies.   
C. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 1996 
1. PL 104-134 
There were two supplementals in FY96 and both were good.  The first 
supplemental, PL 104-134, mainly provided funds for NATO operations in Bosnia.  
There was a sudden step-up jump in activity in NATO operations because the scope of 
the mission had increased.  In December 1995, three months into FY96, President Clinton 
deployed ground forces to Bosnia and additional support forces to neighboring countries.   
PL 104-134 meets the intent of the emergency definition.  First, the supplemental 
was necessary.  The military operation encompassing the scope of Bosnia is costly and 
represents an overall significant portion of the budget.  In retrospect, the costs of Bosnia 
alone represented 1% of the DoD budget.  Second, the events leading up to the 
deployment of ground troops was relatively sudden.  While air strikes were on-going, 
there was no troop build-up.  A massive force was sent at one time.  Next, the need was 
urgent.  Without the new budget authority, other programs would continue to be depleted 
by reprogramming their funds to the necessary accounts to support near-future military 
operations.  Without the supplemental funds, the regular appropriated money used for 
baseline operations would go un-replenished and sacrifice military readiness.  Fourth, 
there was no way to know at the time that NATO operations in Bosnia would become a 
permanent cost to the DoD.  At the time, U.S. Armed Forces thought that the deployment 
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to Bosnia would be over in June 1998.  Finally, there is a mixed sense in determining if 
this event was unforeseen.  Congress did not anticipate the coming ground troop 
deployment.  The funds had not been authorized nor appropriated, which is unlike 
operations in Southwest Asia, which were authorized and appropriated properly.  
However, bombing operations had been on-going in Bosnia.  It is inconclusive to say for 
sure that ground troops would have been necessary, but if military history is considered, 
ground forces are generally always needed to end the conflict with the desires that the 
U.S. wishes to achieve.  The NATO operations portion of the first supplemental 
represented $820 million or 85% and it met the intent of the emergency use. 
Another program that was designated an emergency was the NATO SIP.  It 
accounted for 4%, $37.5 million, of the supplemental and was a good use of the 
supplemental funds.  The funds were necessary as part of rebuilding the war devastated 
areas of Bosnia.  The need for funds was necessary now to begin rebuilding the 
infrastructure and maintain peace in the region.  The need was urgent because any delay 
in funding could risk a schedule delay in the withdrawal of NATO peacekeepers targeted 
for June 1998.  Fourth, this funding would not be permanent.  It was meant for immediate 
repairs to restore infrastructure in Bosnia such as rebuilding bridges and roads.  However, 
this request for funds was not unforeseen.  After the bombing was over, it is generally 
understood that some mechanism must be used to restart economic conditions in a 
country.  Stable economic conditions brought about by sound infrastructure may maintain 
the peace.  Overall, the emergency status of the NATO SIP request for funds was 
satisfactory even though the costs to rebuild infrastructure should have been established 
as part of the exiting plan from Bosnia.   
There are other characteristics to evaluate of PL 104-134.  The funds enacted 
were completely offset even though they were emergency designated.  Not only does this 
keep spending below the spending caps as required, the new budget authority does not 
add to public debt.  Next, the supplemental passed within two months.  For the legislative 
process, that is relatively fast.  In addition, it showed the flexibility of the DoD budget, 
small missions can be absorbed into the budget without additional funds.  There was no 
request for funds for the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to support the evacuation of 
private U.S. citizens or provide extra embassy security in various countries around the 
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world. Finally, there appears to be no pork barrel spending.  Even though the remaining 
funds were not emergency designated for the other three programs (Sematech, B-52H, 
Counter-mine warfare) in this supplemental, the new supplemental budget authority went 
to necessary programs and it was accomplished by using rescissions.  A rescission is 
similar to an earmark to remove funds in the PPBS process.  If it was made and no one 
could justify keeping it, then the mark must be good.  With a similar argument, the 
rescission must be good and the new budget authority is going to a necessary 
requirement.  It should also be noted that the Defense Budget was $921 million less than 
the CRB.  There was more than adequate space to cover the $104 million of non-
emergency programs.  Overall, the first FY96 supplemental was a good supplemental. 
2. PL 104-208 
The second supplemental in FY96 was equally good as the first.  It met the 
conditions that make it an emergency and the characteristics that make it a good 
supplemental.  This defense supplemental was solely in response to the terrorist attack on 
the Marine Corps housing facility at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.   
This supplemental was an emergency need because it provided funding for a 
necessary, sudden, urgent, temporary, and unforeseen event.  The spending was necessary 
to pay for immediate response actions following the terrorist attack.  In addition, future 
preventative measures had to be taken to safeguard lives.  It had been less than a year, 
since the terrorist attack on the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh.  There was no way to 
know if another attack was coming after the Khobar Towers event.  Second, the event 
was sudden.  There was no immediate warning that an attack would occur.  However, 
force protection measures had already been implemented and improved since the 
November attacks on the Saudi National Guard, but those measures were still insufficient 
for the growing weapons capability of terrorists.  Also, funding for this event was urgent.  
Preventing future loss of life and property must be a priority.  Furthermore, this funding 
was not permanent in nature.  It was to pay for actions taken in FY96.  It is true that some 
funds would continue to be available for obligation through FY97, but these funds were 
also part of a larger funding package and they should not be lost because of the end of the 
FY96.  Recall that this supplemental passed on the last day of FY96.  Finally, this 
specific event was unforeseen.  No warning was provided.  However, on the aggregate 
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level of terrorist activities, one might argue that it should have been known that 
something like Khobar Towers would happen eventually.  It should be assumed that not 
all risk can be mitigated and that someone will have an idea not previously conceived to 
protect against and that is what makes the nature of terrorist activities unforeseen.  This 
supplemental funding was a good use of the emergency designation. 
Other characteristics suggest this is a good supplemental.  The one purpose for the 
supplemental was for anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, and security enhancements.  The 
supplemental was quick to respond by passing within four months.  It was completely 
offset even though it was emergency designated and thus kept spending below spending 
limits and did not add to public debt.  This had not been a prior planned contingency.  
The force protection program was executing within their budget, but new funds were now 
needed.  The second supplemental of FY96 was a good supplemental and overall, FY96 
was a good supplemental year.  
D. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 1997 
There was one supplemental for FY97 to support seven programs.  Funds went 
into the OCOTF for peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and operations in Southwest Asia, the 
Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Fund, OHDACA for Red Cross, Defense Health, 
P.O.W., Force Protection, and Family Housing.  Funds for the OCOTF and the Reserve 
Mobilization Income Insurance Fund were designated emergency and accounted for 96% 
of the supplemental.   
The use of the emergency designation for the OCOTF was marginal at best.  The 
supplemental was necessary, urgent, and arguably temporary in nature.  These three 
characteristics support the use of the emergency definition.  The funds were necessary 
because once again, the costs of war can be high.  In addition, the need for the funds was 
urgent.  Once again, military readiness would be negatively impacted if reprogrammed 
funds were not restocked for baseline military operations such as training.  The U.S. was 
committed to the peacekeeping effort and the need to fund it would continue until June 
1998.  By providing a supplemental in the third quarter, there was time to still conduct 
training and perform depot level maintenance.  Furthermore, the sense of this mission 
being temporary was still plausible, even though we really know that the mission in 
Bosnia continued past June 1998.  At the time, due to the complex nature of world 
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events, there was no certainty that the commitment of U.S. Forces would go past 1998.  
However, without a stabilization force in Bosnia, it was likely that civil war would 
resume.  These characteristics support the proper use of the emergency designation.  
However, the funding for the OCOTF was not for a sudden or unforeseen event.  
As operations commenced the year before, there was some time to plan in funds for the 
regular FY97 budget cycle.  With the establishment of the contingency fund for this fiscal 
year, however, the full range of incremental costs was not fully funded.  Later, Table 4.2 
shows that only 37% of the incremental costs were covered in the regular appropriation.  
Of course, there is no way to anticipate contingency costs, but I suggest that 37% was too 
little based on historical incremental costs.  It is possible that the OCOTF was 
intentionally under-funded with appropriators knowing that funds would be given later.  
From this aspect, the use of the emergency designation appears to be poor and overall, 
the use is mixed. 
The second and last program to use the emergency designation was the Reserve 
Mobilization Income Insurance Fund.  The use of the emergency designation was proper 
for the $72 million supplemental funding.  All of the characteristics of an emergency 
were displayed.  The funding was necessary as required by law in the FY96 Defense 
Authorization Act.  The need was sudden and unforeseen because a series of flaws in the 
implementation of the new fund were just being discovered.  The need was urgent 
because as a pseudo-entitlement under a discretionary program, beneficiaries must be 
paid and the fund must remain solvent.  The need for the funding should be temporary in 
nature.  The solvency of the fund was maintained with supplemental spending.  In 
retrospect, we know that the fund received additional funding in the FY98 supplemental, 
but the amount was relatively small and the FY98 Defense Appropriation Act was funded 
solely to cover termination costs to eliminate the program.  The use of the emergency 
designation was proper for this program. 
Other programs in this supplemental did not use the emergency designation, but 
generally were necessary.  The OHDACA account was the biggest of the five remaining 
programs.  OHDACA was established this fiscal year and it was authorized $54.5 
million, but appropriated $49 million.  Not only was there space for more of this 
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appropriation, but the defense budget was $277 million less than the spending cap 
making all non-emergency spending supplemental programs possible.   
Overall, this was a good supplemental.  The programs that used the emergency 
designation were emergencies.  This specific bill passed within one day, but even the 
original bill that was vetoed by the President went through the process within two 
months.  The supplemental demonstrated fiscal responsibility.  Even though most of the 
supplemental was designated an emergency, the entire amount was offset with rescissions 
and therefore, it remained below the spending cap and did not add to public debt.  Next, 
small contingent operations were not added to the defense supplemental and there was no 
evidence of pork.  Finally, even though some of the past contingency operations were 
planned for in the regular appropriation, they were not completely covered and 
supplemental amounts were necessary.  In all, 63% of the incremental costs for FY97 
required a supplemental, which demonstrates that some budget planning is going into on-
going contingent operations.   
E. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 1998 
All of the funding in the FY98 supplemental, $2,860 million, was linked to 
emergency intent (emergency + contingent emergency).  Of that amount, $697 million 
was designated contingent emergency upon enactment of the bill.  Subsequently, all but 
$26 million was designated emergency and therefore, 99% of the FY98 supplemental was 
used by designating it emergency.   
All of the OCOTF and half of the natural disaster aid was designated emergency.  
The remaining six programs and half of the funds for the disaster aid package were 
designated contingent emergency.  The three largest funding packages were OCOTF, 
F/A-18 procurement, and natural disaster aid accounting for 89% of the total 
supplemental.   
The large value items of this supplemental began to stretch the intent of the 
emergency safety valve.  The OCOTF funding was a mixed choice and procurement for 
eight F/A-18s was poor choice for the emergency designation.  There was some good.  
The funds for the natural disasters were good uses for emergency intent.  However, their 
total value was low compared to the funding for the OCOTF and procurement accounts 
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and therefore, overall, the use of the emergency designation was poorly used in this 
supplemental when using dollar value as the base of reference.  
OCOTF received $1,300 million supplemental funds for operations in Southwest 
Asia and $479 million for NATO operations in Bosnia.  [Ref. 74:p. 2-129]  In Southwest 
Asia, the cost for Operation Southern Watch was doubling with the build-up of military 
forces in the first and second fiscal quarters of FY98.  The additional funds were 
necessary and urgent to maintain the U.S. Armed Forces readiness to replenish those 
accounts that had been reprogrammed to support the military build-up.  The need was 
sudden because there was no slow build-up of forces.  The Iraqi defiance started the event 
and then the Coalition had to respond.  This military action would be temporary in that 
operations would probably last less than a year.  However, once again, it is not apparent 
whether this event was unforeseen.  Iraq had a history of non-compliance with U.N. 
resolutions.  However, up until the moment that an Iraqi defector helped U.N. inspectors 
locate weapons of mass destruction, there was no public concrete evidence that they 
existed.  When Iraq began to defy weapons inspectors, the Coalition had to take action 
even though it is suspect whether these actions should have been anticipated.  This was a 
good use of emergency designated funds.   
On the other hand, funds for NATO peacekeeping was a mixed use of the 
emergency designation.  Again, funds were necessary and urgent to maintain readiness, 
but paying for these operations in Bosnia were becoming routine.  Some critics would 
argue that this supplement was not unforeseen.  This is what complicates this fiscal year’s 
NATO supplement.  The regular appropriation was written such that no funds in the 
entire FY98 DoD Appropriation could be used for operations in Bosnia after June 30, 
1998.  Furthermore, a supplement would have to be requested by the President in order to 
continue operations after declaring to Congress that he intended to keep forces in Bosnia 
and his justification for it.  In retrospect, it was skillfully played by President Clinton.  
Not only did he get legislation written into the appropriation that would essentially allow 
him to keep forces deployed to Bosnia, it was written such that NATO knew what actions 
to take if U.S. troops would withdraw.  NATO declared it would withdraw all member 
country troops if U.S. troops departed Bosnia.  It was believed that an expanded war 
would inevitably return to the Balkans in this event and thus, U.S. troops remained in 
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Bosnia.  In this respect, the NATO supplement was not unforeseen.  Of course, if a 
supplement was not provided, the DoD would bear the brunt in reduced funds for 
readiness in order to pay for the continued contingent operation.   
The procurement of eight F/A-18 aircraft for the Marine Corps is difficult to 
categorize.  There were insufficient data found that supports what this funding was for.  
However, when the bill was introduced, there was no mention of the request for the 
aircraft and by the conference report, the $273 million was written into the legislation.  
The QDR revealed that the new and improved aircraft, which was about to enter full-rate 
production, was necessary for future Navy operations.  Furthermore, of the 20 authorized, 
all 20 were appropriated in the regular bill.  I speculate that there was a potential contract 
breach or that one of the committee members from one of the contributing aircraft 
construction states saw it as a chance for pork.  However, there is no conclusive evidence 
of this. 
I believe that the following four funding packages were a good use of the 
emergency designation in this supplemental:  O&M natural disaster relief, Reserve 
Mobilization Income Insurance Fund, OHDACA for the Red Cross disaster relief, and 
MILCON/Family Housing natural disaster aid.  These programs met the true intent of the 
OMB criteria when funding was either necessary because an existing law requires 
payments or an unforeseen emergency event occurs such as natural disaster.  (Note: The 
insurance fund was backed by government funding protection.)  This is the true intent of 
the emergency designation, but the use has been clouded by a growing contingency need 
in the DoD.     
Another characteristic of this supplemental made it a bad supplemental.  There 
was not a single rescission.  If the emergency designation had not been used, the defense 
discretionary spending cap of $290,000 million would have been breeched.  [Ref. 62]  On 
the good side, however, there was a quick response to disaster and contingency needs and 
the supplemental was passed in the mid-third quarter.  In summary, this was a mixture of 




F. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 1999 
1. PL 105-277 
Recall that CBO regards this funding as part of the regular appropriation, but for 
study in this research, I have considered it to be supplemental funding.  Part of this 
confusion may lie in the nature of this funding.  There was $8,321 million in emergency 
intent spending with about 94% of it eventually being designated emergency.  A study of 
the use of the emergency designation is necessary.  This will be accomplished by looking 
at the top four of eleven programs because they represent 64% of this bill.   
The first program reviewed is the OCOTF.  $2,298 million had been appropriated 
in five days for operations in Southwest Asia and Bosnia.  This supplemental funding 
violated almost every aspect of the definition of emergency.  Was the funding necessary?  
Yes, it was necessary to pay for continued operations in these two theaters.  Without it, 
money would doubtly be transferred from other readiness and infrastructure programs.  
However, this funding was neither sudden, urgent, temporary, nor unforeseen.  President 
Clinton had made it clear that U.S. Armed Forces would remain to support the NATO 
SFOR.  The Congress knew that it would have to continue funding the incremental costs 
or readiness would be sacrificed.  This funding was not urgent because some funding had 
been provided in the regularly appropriated OCOTF and another supplemental could be 
provided later if necessary to offset incremental costs.  However, supplementals are 
normally disruptive to the budget cycle and it was logical to include it in this emergency 
regular/supplemental spending package for FY99.  Just as this event was not sudden, it 
was not temporary nor unforeseen.  U.S. Armed Forces had now been involved with this 
NATO mission to Bosnia for the previous three years and there was no exit strategy in 
place.  The U.S. would remain attached to the NATO SFOR operation.   
The second emergency funding was for a “readiness” package spread throughout 
14 MILPERS and O&M accounts and the Defense Health Program.  This spending 
package does not meet the intent of emergency either.  There was a definite need for 
funding.  Money would be for recruiting and retention efforts, spare parts, personnel 
tempo relief, depot maintenance, defense health, and combat equipment.  Payments for 
re-enlistment bonuses must happen.  Maintenance of ships, aircraft, and equipment must 
be done to ensure an adequate level of readiness.  As FY00 supplementals will discuss, 
70 
the Defense Health Program is required to continue providing benefits regardless of its 
administrative capabilities.  Regardless of these needs, these needs are part of the PPBS 
system and are part of the routine budgeting request for funds. 
The readiness needs were neither sudden, urgent, temporary, nor unforeseen.  As 
in previous years, readiness at the expense of contingency operations was addressed.  The 
deficiency of funding had not developed suddenly and was not unforeseen.  While the 
funding was necessary, it was not urgent nor would it require temporary attention.  The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) pointed out on September 29, 1998 that additional funds were 
necessary or that the military could become ineffective within five years.  This suggests 
that action was not required in this bill.  There was time to respond within the regular 
PPBS process.  The JCS had made this request less than one month before this funding 
was enacted suggesting that they had waited long enough and now it was time to speak 
out to fix the readiness problems that the Armed Services Committee had tired to address 
in earlier years.  [Ref. 74:p. 28]   
The third emergency spending package was for the Year 2000 (Y2K) information 
technology issue.  $1,100 million was designated contingent emergency.  This was a 
mixed good and bad use of the emergency category.  The funding was necessary to fix 
the computer coding problems in all defense activities.  Without these fixes, it was 
believed that all technology operations could be disrupted.  This event was also urgent 
and temporary.  In just over one year, all computer chip applications would be affected 
by this event.  Furthermore, this was only a one-time event.  After Y2K, these coding 
issues would not need to be addressed again.  The ability to determine if this was sudden 
and unforeseen is subjective however.  Some would argue that it was well known that this 
event was approaching and computer programmers had warned users.  There had been 
time previously to prepare for this event.  There was no evidence of appropriation for this 
in the 1998 Defense Appropriation Act.   
Finally, Anti-Missile Defense was the fourth major spending package.  This also 
seemed to be in mixed alignment with the definition of emergency.  The Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) had established that the program had been under-funded and was 
in need of immediate funding.  However, the need did not arise suddenly, nor was it 
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unforeseen.  The FY99 authorization and appropriation were very much aligned which 
indicates the congressional process was well aligned in this matter.  However, in the 
previous years, there had been a continuous battle between the President and Congress on 
how much funding was enough for missile defense.  The QDR re-enforced that the 
program had been under-funded and now suffered from schedule and technical risks.  
This was a matter for the defense PPBS and not the supplemental process.  Future 
increased funding for this program would be necessary.  The question became would it be 
budgeted for in the PPBS or would it be placed in a supplemental.  A look into FY00 
indicates that the Anti-Missile Defense Program did get another $125 million for the 
Patriot missile system.  From a historical perspective, it would seem that this type of 
funding would not be temporary.  Finally, this funding might be urgent.  There is a large 
variance of subjectivity in determining if the threat required an urgent response that could 
not wait for future planning in the PPBS.  However, the general nature of schedule and 
technical risks to the program and the overall good it provides to the U.S. and its allies 
seem to suggest that continuing to acquire the capability should not be lost.   
The four uses of the emergency category seem to be poorly used in PL 105-277.  
Furthermore, this seems to be a poor supplemental overall.  There were zero rescissions 
provided.  The emergency designation would be necessary to prevent the spending cap 
from being violated.  Next, this became a supplemental not so much responding to a past 
event, but amounts that were anticipated for future use.  The incremental costs for 
missions in Bosnia and Southwest Asia had not yet been incurred.  The funding for 
readiness was in anticipation of future shortfalls.  The Y2K problem was a future event.  
Anti-missile defense continued to be future looking program to protect against future 
threats.   
It should be noted that there was $429 million in emergency intent funding in this 
supplemental.  It was for responding and repairing storm damages due to hurricanes on 
the U.S. Eastern Coast and monsoon damages in the Pacific.  There should be no doubt 
that this is the true intent of the use of emergency funds.  Natural disasters of this type are 
sudden, temporary, and unforeseen because they cannot be predicted as to when or where 
they may strike.   
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Perhaps most of the spending in PL 105-277 seemed bad because of the timing.  It 
could be that CBO was accurate in that it placed all this spending in the regular 
appropriation category.  The use of the emergency definition in this funding remains 
poor.  The use of the emergency bypasses the good intent of proper fiscal planning in the 
PPBS.  The second supplemental would be more characteristic of its timing in the fiscal 
year.   
2. PL 106-31 
$10,887 million of this supplemental had emergency intent.  When it was first 
enacted, 63% or $6,822 was designated contingent emergency.  Subsequently, $9,049 
million was designated emergency and therefore utilizing 83% of the supplemental.   
This supplemental used the emergency designation well in some parts of this 
supplemental and poorly in other parts.  Over half of the funds were designed to go to 
contingency operations.  The remaining amount was dispersed in readiness, MILCON, 
and disaster relief projects.   
Over half of this supplemental was intended for contingency operations.  OCOTF 
received most of its funds to pay for Kosovo, which had become a new mission for the 
U.S. Armed Forces in recent months.  Some of the funds went to pay for additional 
incremental costs in Southwest Asia.  The two will be discussed separately. 
Nearly $5 billion of the supplemental was intended for Kosovo.  This was a good 
use of the emergency designation.  The need for funds was necessary.  Without them, the 
incremental costs would severely detract from routine missions of the military.  The need 
was sudden.  There was no build up of military activity before commencing air strikes.  
There had been ethic fighting in the region for several years, but the U.S. had never 
become involved in Kosovo.  The ethnic Albanians had asked for assistance before and 
were rejected.  Now, NATO found its mission in the Balkans expanded and suddenly 
taking on another peacekeeping mission.  This may support that the peacekeeping 
mission was not completely unforeseen, but still sudden.  Next, the need for the funding 
was urgent.  Costs of the air war were accumulating quickly.  The need was so urgent that 
Congress ensured the incremental costs of Kosovo would be compensated for by 
providing more than what the President had requested by providing funds for the follow-
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on ground forces.  Finally, the funding was intended to be temporary.  After the NATO 
mission was complete, it was anticipated that a U.N. task force would enter the region to 
oversea stability.  This was a good use of the emergency designation. 
The supplemental funding for Southwest Asia was not a good use of the 
emergency designation.  Of the $739 million authorized for Southwest Asia, only $439 
million was appropriated in the regular appropriation.  No additional funding was 
provided in the first emergency supplemental in October 1998.  Now, PL 106-31 
provided another $453 million.  This should not be surprising since the average 
incremental costs for the previous three years had been $1,032 million.  However, 
operations Desert Thunder and Desert Fox in late 1998 may have not been anticipated, 
their combined incremental costs were $136 million.  [Ref. 23:p. 15]  While the funding 
was necessary, it was not sudden, temporary, nor unforeseen.  Operations in Southwest 
Asia had been established and they would continue.  The unpredictability is only in the 
scope of operations.   
The second funding package was for “readiness.”  Once again, this would not be a 
good use of the emergency escape clause.  This was the second time readiness would be 
getting emergency funding for the year and it was valued at $4,188 million.  While the 
need exists for the funds, these supplemental amounts are attempting to defeat the regular 
PPBS approach to budgeting.  For example, some of this funding would depend on future 
authorization such as in the MILPERS accounts for military pay and retirement costs.  
That alone was valued at $1,838 million.  Other amounts were necessary to support 
unfunded depot maintenance.  Once again, the choice was made in the PPBS approach 
that the risk was acceptable not to fund those activities.  This is part of the conundrum of 
public, federal budgeting.  The previously budgeted amounts were being discarded by 
providing the supplemental amounts.  This violates the intent of making sound fiscal 
decisions in an environment of limited resources.  This need is neither temporary, sudden, 
nor unforeseen and is a bad use of the emergency safety valve.   
Finally, additional funding was intended for the Balkan region by providing funds 
to support MILCON and re-enforce military infrastructure.  This is definitely not a good 
use of the emergency designation.  The Pentagon identified a need.  However, 
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construction projects take time.  With operations on-going in the Balkans over the last 
three years, there was no surprise that the U.S. would be remaining in the region.  This is 
funding that could have been planned for in the PPBS and it was a bad use of the 
emergency category.  More importantly, some would argue that this item was full of 
pork.  Of the original $1.1 billion, only $475 million would remain for the Pentagon 
priority projects.  As noted by Wisconsin Democrat David R. Obey, “more than half the 
construction projects were slated for funding after fiscal 2000 or were not even in the 
Pentagon’s long-range plans.”  [Ref. 75:p. 2-155]  While this may be pork, I also suggest 
that this is a form of forward-funding strategy taking place in the supplemental.  It is 
becoming a way to make space in future budgets so they will not take up budget authority 
later and therefore, making space for other items when the regular appropriation comes 
along.  [Ref. 75:p. 2-154]   
The disaster relief projects provided $247 million in aid.  The Central American 
Disaster Assistance was a good example of the emergency definition.  This is actually a 
win/win project.  The military provides the relief by rebuilding in other countries and 
providing humanitarian support after a natural disaster while giving our military the 
experience it needs to maintain their skills.   $31 million was for disaster relief of U.S. 
bases.  All of the funding was offset with savings on paper and ironically, the funding 
was designated non-emergency when this would be a good use of the emergency 
designation.   
The supplemental funding for Kosovo, about half of this supplemental, was an 
excellent example in the use of the emergency designation.  However, the remainder of 
this bill was not congruent with the intent of the emergency designation.   
3. Conclusion for FY99 
The emergency category for funding was poorly used in FY99.  Most of the 
funding packages would not meet the intent of the emergency definition.  However, as 
explained below, without the emergency safety valve, none of the funding would have 
been possible unless rescissions had been expertly used. 
G. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 2000 
FY00 had two supplementals totaling $9,135 million.  Of the two bills, $8,762 
million were initially designated contingent emergency.  Of that amount, almost all of it 
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would become designated emergency.  Therefore, 97% of the funds utilized were 
designated emergency and 3% were non-emergency. 
The four largest of the 20 categories of programs in this fiscal year will be 
analyzed.  Combined, they represent a good and bad mix for these two supplementals.  
The first package is for contingency funding.  Both supplementals provided funds to the 
OCOTF.  PL 106-246 was dedicated solely for funding of NATO operations in Kosovo.  
This was a mixed bad use of the emergency designation for one major point.  The 
operations were specifically not provided for in the regular defense appropriation.  
President Clinton stated that he would request a supplemental to cover the costs in 
Kosovo.  [Ref. 75:p. 2-29]  Furthermore, the Defense Authorization Act of 2000 made it 
clear that the President should request funds for Kosovo in a supplemental.  Therefore, 
both the President and Congress did not intend to budget for operations in Kosovo in the 
regular appropriation process even though it was recognized that the costs to the U.S. 
would range from $2 billion to $5 billion.  Then, it was not until the fourth fiscal quarter 
that funds were provided which is damaging to defense baseline operations.  What makes 
this so bad is that it is apparent that the funding would have been needed to support the 
NATO KFOR.  Essentially, this need was necessary and urgent, but it was not sudden, 
temporary, nor unforeseen.  In early 1999, when the U.S. committed forces for the NATO 
mission, it was stated that Forces would be present until the U.N. peacekeeping mission 
was established.  That peacekeeping force turned out to be the NATO KFOR.  The funds 
for these incremental costs were necessary to prevent damage to readiness.  While that is 
a good use of the emergency safety valve to cover the costs of a peacekeeping mission, 
the process of getting to the funding demonstrated poor fiscal responsibility to the public 
in respect to planning.   
Next, funding for the second supplemental, PL 106-259 may have been to cover 
additional defense incremental costs for the fiscal year and/or as a ploy to move funds 
forward from fiscal year 2001.  Regardless, funds in the OCOTF are usually available 
until expended.  Furthermore, if they are not utilized in the account they are transferred 
to, and then they may be transferred back to the OCOTF account.  This is a good ploy for 
making budget authority available in future years and thus leaving space in future 
appropriations for other programs and subsequently not using the emergency designation 
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then.  If this tactic is utilized, it appears to be an unsound strategy to get funding into the 
budget while circumventing fiscal planning and responsibility to manage public debt.  In 
a manner of speaking, it is making a loan on future spending without having a defined 
use.  Another way to look would be to call it a blank check.  This is counter-intuitive to 
the budgeting processes and forcing the organization to plan efficiently and effectively 
for the use of constrained resources.  Ultimately, the additional funding was necessary to 
cover the full range of incremental costs for FY00.  Without the second supplemental, 
only 84% of the incremental costs were have been covered for the fiscal year and the 
DoD would have been required to absorb the remainder.  From that aspect, it makes this a 
good supplemental amount.  However, the concept of forward funding makes this a poor 
use of the emergency designation 
The second major funding package was for the defense Working Capital Funds.  
The funding was to cover the cost of increased fuel prices and this was a good use of the 
emergency designation.  Without the funding, operational tempo is forced to be reduced 
whether it is for steaming hours, flying hours, or tank miles.  These funds were necessary 
and urgent.  The fluctuation of oil prices is difficult to anticipate and may be unforeseen.  
The PPBS plans for a certain amount two years in advance.  The global price of oil can 
change is less time based on domestic and international events.  This type of additional 
funding should be temporary in nature because future planning will include those costs.  
As a matter of fact, when there is a savings for a drop in fuel prices, those funds can be 
reprogrammed or rescinded to cover other budget authority.   
The third major supplemental spending package was for the Defense Health 
Program.  The funding may have been necessary to support the health program, but 
nothing about this funding indicates it was a surprise.  It was not unforeseen, sudden, nor 
would it be temporary in nature to fix.  As stated above, there was a hint that the program 
was beginning to have problems.  In FY99, $200 million was necessary for funding 
shortfalls based on new mission requirements, management programs, and backlogs in 
property maintenance.  [Ref. 44:p. 1520]  Now in FY00, Congress was questioning 
problems with claims and the administration of the program.  Claims adjustments went 
back to 1998 and a GAO investigation would investigate the program deficiencies.  
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Clearly, this program required attention, but it was not a good use of the emergency 
designation to bypass spending caps.   
The fourth major spending package was for “readiness” representing $529 million 
from the second supplemental.  Again, readiness is disrupted from contingency 
operations.  On the manpower aspect, “service members return home . . . less ready to 
fight and win the nation’s wars than before they left.”  [Ref. 71:p. 2289]  Furthermore, 
insufficient funding for contingency operations will damage readiness.  The funds for 
operations in Kosovo demonstrate that.  Funding for that operation came very late in the 
year.  Once again, “military leaders have said they need to know they will be getting 
supplemental funds soon, or they will have to start canceling training exercises scheduled 
for later this summer.”  [Ref. 69:p. 1382]  Furthermore, depot maintenance would be 
delayed and spare parts would not be provided in this kind of budget crunch.  However, 
once again, the fundamental basic of funding for readiness is present.  There is a choice 
to be made to in planning for the shortfalls in readiness.  This need had not been 
unforeseen nor had it been a sudden event.  As the Air Force Chief of Staff stated, “We 
have mortgaged long-term readiness to shore up near-term readiness.”  [Ref. 71:p. 2289]  
From this aspect, it would appear that the use of the emergency designation was a poor 
choice.  Funding was being provided on an emergency basis based on previous budgeting 
choices made some years before.   
$219 million was dedicated to six non-emergency programs.  There was $322 
million in rescissions, which satisfies the legal requirement for offsets in non-emergency 
supplemental funding.  This was a good aspect to the supplemental.   
There was an offset for one designated contingent emergency account.  It was for 
$90 million in procurement for the F-15 in the U.S. Air Force.  There were no other 
offsets for emergency funding and that supports a poor use of the supplemental.   
The small operation in East Timor was funded in PL 106-246.  $62 million was 
provided in the supplemental to cover the $57 million in incremental costs.  This was a 
good use of the emergency designation.  It paid for a necessary incurred cost that was 
sudden, temporary, and unforeseen during the PPBS.  However, it was not offset with 
rescissions.   
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Overall, this was a bad year for the supplemental.  The supplemental appeared to 
be used as a “fix it” tool.  Many of the needs of the DoD had developed because of 
unfunded requirements, increased contingency missions, or the budgeting choices made 
in the past.  Furthermore, there was almost no attempt to offset new budget authority.  In 
the time of budget surplus, there must have been a feeling of no need to find rescissions.  
Finally, if there had been rescissions, it most likely would have been cutting into needs in 
other areas of the DoD, but this was not evaluated.  Suffice it to say, CBO determined in 
FY00 that the budget was short nearly $51 million of the requirements.  [Ref. 16:p. xii]  
CBO calculated that the sustaining-budget estimate was $340 billion.  However, the 
regular appropriation for FY00 had been $289 million.   
H. NATURE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
1. Spending Caps 
 
    Fiscal Year (Budget Authority in millions of dollars) 
  96 97 98 99 00 
CRB Defense Function 050a 264,700 265,583 268,200 None 288,812 
 House Versiong    270,500  
 Senate Versionh    270,500  
 Discretionary Defense Limitj    271,500  
      
Defense Regular Appropriation, Netb 264,423 264,662 267,989 270,390 286,540 
Defense Supplemental Appropriation, Netc -1,033 -1 2,830 9,050 8,822 
Defense Supplemental Appropriation, adji na na na 8,323 na 
Total Defense Appropriations 263,390 264,661 270,819 287,763 295,362 
      
Difference, Appropriations less CRB -1,310 -922 2,619 16,263 6,550 
      
Defense Emergency Designatione 982 2,077 2,834 16,845 8,834f 
      
Net difference, includes Emergency Funds -2,292 -2,999 -215 -582 -2,284 
       
Notes      
a Source:  [Ref. 58-61]      
b Source:  [Ref. 9:pp. 25-26]      
c Source:  [Ref. 4:pp. 16, 26]      
d Negative value indicates less new budget authority than proposed in CRB.  
e Source:  [Ref. 6:p. 4]  Note:  Includes regular and supplemental amounts unless indicated. 
f Source:  [Ref. 4:p. 26]  Note:  Amount includes supplemental emergencies only.  
g Source:  [Ref. 26]      
h Source:  [Ref. 27]      
i Source:  [Ref. 37]  Note:  Calculated from total defense amount in emergency section. 
j Source:  [Ref. 62]  Note:  This value is used as it is the statutory limit.     
 
Table 4.1. Spending Limit Analysis. 
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The Federal Budget must remain under its spending caps and the Department of 
Defense is no different.  The defense budget function must remain below its prescribed 
discretionary spending cap.  In the BEA of 1997 for instance, there may be one 
discretionary spending cap combining defense and non-defense activities or discretionary 
spending may be broken into two separate caps and described as defense and non-
defense.  Regardless of how the BEA of 1990 and 1997 defined the caps, the CRB is 
required to remain within the confines of the legal spending caps.  For instance, the BEA 
of 1997 states that the discretionary limit for defense is $271,500 million for FY99.  
However, in FY00, the statutory limit on discretionary spending was $532,693 million 
net.  This allows Congress to apportion discretionary spending differently as needs 
change in future years.  Throughout the 1990s, more discretionary spending was shifting 
toward non-defense accounts.  DoD must remain under the Defense function spending 
caps imposed in the CRB because the CRB limits must remain under the discretionary 
spending caps as imposed by the DCA of 1985 and the BEA of 1990 as revised in 1997.   
The emergency designation is necessary to keep net annual appropriations below 
the spending limits.  Table 4.1 is an analysis of how supplementals and the emergency 
designation affect the defense discretionary spending limits for fiscal years 1996 through 
2000.  The CRB indicates the budget limit.  There was no CRB for 1999 and both the 
House and Senate versions of their CRB will infer the limit.  Both versions placed the 
defense limit at $270,500 million and it will be used as it is below the statute limit of 
$271,500 million.  Next, the net Defense regular appropriation and net Defense 
supplemental appropriations for each fiscal year were added together for the total amount 
of defense appropriations.  The total appropriations amount was subtracted from the CRB 
and the difference is tabulated.  A negative value means that the total appropriation is less 
than the spending limit.  FY98, FY99, and FY00 were all above their limits if they are not 
adjusted using the emergency designation.  Next, the amount of the emergency 
designated funds for the year are tabulated and used to adjust the budget limit up as is 
allowed in the DCA of 1985.  The emergency designated funds were based on regular 
and supplemental appropriations except for FY00.  No data for FY00 was available for 
the regular appropriation.  Finally, the net difference, which incorporates the new 
spending limit, is tabulated.  Again, negative values indicate how much the 
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appropriations were below the spending limits.  As required, each fiscal years net budget 
was below the spending limits.  The emergency designation was instrumental in 
achieving this.   
2. Planning For Contingencies   
 
    FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00
Total Incremental Costsa 3,272 3,076 3,602 5,982 4,482
     
OCOTF (regular appropriation only)b NA 1,140 1,884 439 1,723
OCOTF (supplemental only)b NA 1,430 1,814 6,866 3,150
OCOTF (regular & supplemental)b NA 2,570 3,698 7,305 4,873
       
% of regular OCOTF covers incremental costs NA 37% 52% 7% 38%
% of all OCOTF covers incremental costs NA 84% 103% 122% 109%
       
Note: (Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)    
a Source:  [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]      
b Source:  [Ref. 28-38]           
 
Table 4.2. Incremental Costs and Contingency Fund Analysis. 
 
OCOTF is a contingency account.  It is used to pay for incremental costs incurred 
due to military operations for either war or other-than-war operations that are above 
baseline routine operations in the DoD.  To anticipate the future costs is difficult, but 
estimates are made and money is appropriated and programmed in the routine budget 
cycle.   
While it is possible to plan for some contingency operations, it is never enough.  
After 1995, DERF was not used again until 2001.  Instead, in FY97 contingency 
operations were budgeted for.  Recall from Table 3.4 that the OCOTF was funded in each 
regular appropriation.  In each case, the funds were not designated an emergency.  This 
suggests that missions in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were planned.  However, 
as Table 4.2 shows, the OCOTF in the regular appropriation was never enough to pay for 
the incremental costs.  On average, it only paid for about 30% of the incremental costs.  
Each year members of the DoD would go to Congress and testify that more funds were 
needed; otherwise, readiness and future infrastructure would be negatively affected.  
Subsequently, each supplemental included funds for the OCOTF.  In FY97, the 
supplemental OCOTF amount was not enough to pay for the incremental costs.  
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However, FY98, FY99, and FY00 incremental costs were completely paid for.  It should 
be noted that the second OCOTF supplemental in FY00 was designated contingent.  If 
none of those funds were designated emergency, then the OCOTF fund for FY00 would 
only pay for 84% of the incremental costs.  Without actual historical data for FY00, the 
pay off for FY00 falls between 84% and 109%.  Contingency operations can be planned 
for, but they are not always completely paid for.   
3. Intent of the Supplemental 
The supplemental could be used for one of two reasons.  Each reason is 
predicated by the fact that the budget was under-funded in the regular appropriation 
process.  First, a routine need has developed.  That routine need requires a supplemental 
in an emergency capacity because the contingent events were not planned for in the 
planning phase of federal budgeting.  Second, the legislative or executive branch of 
government uses the strategic under-funding concept.  In the regular appropriation 
process, the appropriators give less, knowing that later the needs will have to be funded.  
This assumes that the appropriators really know that the need is more than what they are 
actually giving and it is strategically planned.     
FY96 was an overall good year for supplemental spending.  The first 
supplemental was a good use of the emergency designation.  Its main goal was to cover 
incremental costs for peacekeeping and it did it promptly during the third fiscal quarter.  
The second supplemental was also a good use of the emergency designation.  It 
responded quickly to changing world event.  Also, not all of the funding for anti-terrorist 
activities was bunched in the supplemental.  Some funding went into the regular 
appropriation.  This indicates that the regular appropriation was under-funded, knowing 
that the additional funds would be made up in the supplemental.  Otherwise, a bulk of the 
funds that were requested would fall into the Wlezien “onset of war” model.  [Ref. 20:p. 
58]  In other words, they were based on new contingent events.   
FY97 was another good year for supplemental spending.  Most of the funding was 
to pay for contingent events.  The emergency designation was used properly most of the 
time and funding was provided in a timely manner in the third fiscal quarter.  Most of this 
funding may fall into the strategically under-funded category.  The total incremental costs 
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for military operations were not budgeted.  Some, but not all incremental costs were 
subsequently offset with a supplemental.    
FY 98 was a bad year for supplemental spending.  Again most of the funding was 
to pay for contingent events.  However, the use of the emergency designation was poorly 
chosen.  The funding was to pay for events that were becoming routine.  This type of 
strategy may fall into the strategically under-funded category.  Less is provided in the 
regular budget, knowing that more will have to be provided later in the supplemental to 
cover the incremental costs. 
FY99 was bad year for supplemental spending also.  Many of the programs that 
used the emergency designation were done so in violation of the intent of the designation.  
Much of this funding was necessary due to under-funding of other programs.  Much of 
what the CBO would call regular appropriation with emergency designation was poorly 
used.  Much of this funding would fall into the category of insufficient or under-funded 
regular appropriation.  This is complicated by the fact that some would call the first 
supplemental spending part of the regular appropriation.  However, there was a genuine 
need for half of the funding in the second supplemental because there was for a new 
mission in Kosovo.  The other half, mostly readiness money, was necessary for what 
were under-funded programs.  At this point, it is unclear if strategic under-funding was 
really the mechanism being pursued by government. 
FY00 was a bad year for supplemental spending also.  The emergency designation 
was used poorly in most cases based on what it is intended for.  FY00 seemed to be a “fix 
the DoD” year for funding.  The under-funding of the past was catching up with the DoD.  
Requesting additional funds was becoming routine.  
I. SUMMARY 
During the FY96 through FY00 period, the purpose of the defense supplemental 
changed.  Initially, it was a useful tool to pay for disasters, mandatory requirements, and 
the costs of adding new missions.  Some say that during these years, the DoD was 
significantly under-funded.  The real value of defense budget was shrinking while the 
requirements and missions increased.  This may have caused this evolution in the purpose 
of the defense supplemental.  By FY00, the defense supplemental appeared to be 
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necessary to pay for requirements that should have been funded in the regular 
appropriation.  Furthermore, the use of the emergency designation was poorly used.  The 
emergency designation became a tool to push the defense discretionary spending limits 
up on a routine basis.   
While some contingency planning was possible, it was never enough in the 
regular appropriation.  A supplemental was requested to offset the incremental costs 
associated with peacekeeping.  The regular funding for contingency accounts did not use 
the emergency designation.  There was an attempt to control spending by budgeting for 
those costs.  However, there is always a supplemental to cover more of the contingency 


























The defense supplemental appropriation can be used for various purposes.  As 
Wlezien’s model indicates, supplemental appropriations can be used for the following 
factors:  budgetary growth, the onset of war, economic conditions, strategic under-
appropriation, transition in administrations, shifts in the composition of Congress, and 
Election.  The narrow time span of this study eliminates the “transition in 
administrations” variable.  Furthermore, the Congress remained mostly the same 
throughout the period.  That eliminated the “shifts in the composition of Congress” 
category.  However, budgetary growth, the onset of war, economic conditions, strategic 
under-appropriation, and elections cannot be eliminated as factors on the supplemental.  
This study was to focus on any pattern that may exist in relation to strategic under-
appropriation to help answer the primary question.  The primary question was to 
determine if the appropriation process is a one-step or two-step process.   
First, neither the President nor the Congress seems to budget for supplementals.  
When a supplemental is used, either the emergency clause must be used to set a new 
discretionary spending limit or a rescission must be provided.  This is necessary because 
the budget is programmed almost entirely up to the spending cap. 
Second, it may be difficult to determine who initiates a supplemental.  The 
President can ask for it or the Congress can.  If the Congress asks for it, it might be seen 
as a Contingent Emergency.  If the President originates it and the Congress accepts it, it is 
seen in the legislation as designated emergency.  As the supplementals progressed, a 
greater percentage of the supplemental funding was enacted as contingent emergency.  
However, at some point, the President made a request for the funding and most of the 
supplemental would become designated emergency.   
Third, as the supplementals progressed, more emergency funding was placed into 
the supplemental.  This spending was usually congruent with the DoD mission and there 
was little evidence of pork barrel spending in the supplemental.   
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Fourth, as the level of incremental costs increased, there was more supplemental 
funding.  The defense budget went from absorbing some of the costs to completely 
offsetting incremental costs. 
Finally, as the supplementals progressed, it became apparent that supplemental 
funding might be more than a one-time expenditure.  It becomes routine to ask for 
additional funding in the supplemental.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
There was little evidence that strategic under-appropriation is what drove 
supplemental requests during the FY96 through FY00 period.  More importantly, a new 
factor may have been identified.  As budgetary under-funding continues, the stress on the 
organization begins to tear away at its normal capabilities.  Essentially, supplementals 
must be requested to make up for deficiencies in the organization.    
Finally, in this period when a federal budget surplus developed, there was less and 
less use of rescissions to offset additional spending.  With the emergency designation, it 
is possible to get around the spending caps.  However, the additional spending would add 
to national debt.  In a period of surplus, it is possible to add supplemental spending 
without adding to public debt.   
The goal must be to remain on the path to responsible budgeting.  By preventing 
or minimizing the budget gap, there may be a lower chance of the emergency designation 
being used on a routine basis.  As the CBO recommends, either lower the requirements, 
increase the funding, or do a mixture of both to lower the gap.  [Ref. 16:pp. 25-30] 
CBO also recommended options to better enforce spending limits.  Those 
recommendations were the following:  Eliminate the emergency exemption; Require a 
supermajority vote for emergencies; Establish criteria for emergency spending; Establish 
a reserve fund for emergencies.  [Ref. 5:pp. 14-20] These requirements may force a 
return to a more responsible way to budgeting in defense.   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There is some ambiguity of when emergency funding is categorized as regular or 
supplemental.  Such an example is found in PL 105-277.  More of the total emergency 
funding was designated emergency in the first supplemental.  While the amount of 
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contingent emergency was higher than in PL 106-31, more of the funds were eventually 
designated emergency.  The first supplemental was enacted with 25% of it designated 
emergency.  Eventually, 94% of it would be designated emergency.  Next, the second 
supplemental was enacted as 37% designated emergency.  Eventually, 83% was 
designated emergency, which is less than the first supplemental.  Perhaps the first 
funding was seen more important as it was enacted with more symbolic attachment to the 
regular appropriation.  Not only did this legislation pass five days after the DoD 
appropriation, it also contained funds for programs that had been under-funded in the 
past.  Furthermore, more of the funding was forward-looking.  It was to pay for events 
that had yet to occur.  Part of the need of a supplemental is to respond to an emergent 
need that has already arisen.  The cost has been incurred and without additional funds, 
other programs will suffer.  PL 105-277 was different in that it would pay for future 
programs.  Funds had yet to be obligated or expended.  The events can be controlled and 
planned.  This is a problem that may deserve further study.  The question would be, “is an 
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APPENDIX.  SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE USE OF 
THE EMERGENCY DESIGNATION BY FISCAL YEAR. 
A. FISCAL YEAR 1996 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET 
SEC. 314. SENSE OF THE HOUSE ON EMERGENCIES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The House of Representative finds that— 
(1) The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 exempted from the discretionary 
spending limits and the Pay-As-You-Go requirements for entitlement and 
tax legislation funding requirements that are designated by Congress and 
the President as an emergency. 
(2) Congress and the President have increasingly misused the emergency 
designation by— 
(A) designating funding as an emergency that is neither unforeseen 
nor a genuine emergency; and 
(B) circumventing spending limits or passing controversial items 
that would not pass scrutiny in a freestanding bill. 
(b) SENSE OF THE HOUSE.—It is the sense of the House that Congress should 
study alternative approaches to budgeting for emergencies, including codifying 
the definition of an emergency and establishing contingency funds to pay for 
emergencies. And the Senate agree to the same. 
 
B. FISCAL YEAR 1997 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET 
SEC. 422. SENSE OF THE HOUSE ON EMERGENCIES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The House of Representatives finds that: 
(1) The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 exempted from the discretionary 
spending limits and the Pay-As-You-Go requirements for entitlement and 
tax legislation funding requirements that are designated by Congress and 
the President as an emergency. 
(2) Congress and the President have increasingly misused the emergency 
designation by— 
(A) designating as emergencies funding requirements that are 
predictable and do not pose a threat to life, property, or national 
security, 
(B) designating emergencies with the sole purpose of 
circumventing statutory and congressional spending limitations, 
and 
(C) adding to emergency legislation controversial items that would 
not otherwise withstand public scrutiny. 
(b) SENSE OF THE HOUSE.—It is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that in order to balance the Federal budget Congress should consider alternative 
approaches to budgeting for emergencies, including codifying the definition of an 
emergency, establishing contingency funds to pay for emergencies, and fully 
offsetting the costs of emergencies with rescissions of spending authority that 
would have been obligated but for the rescission. 
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C. FISCAL YEAR 1998 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET 
SEC. 322. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON DISASTER ASSISTANCE 
FUNDING. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate finds that— 
(1) emergency spending adds to the deficit and total spending; 
(2) the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 exempts emergency spending 
from the discretionary spending caps and pay-go requirements; 
(3) the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 expires in 1998 and needs to be 
extended; 
(4) since the enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act, Congress and the 
President have approved an average of $5,800,000,000 per year in 
emergency spending; and 
(5) a natural disaster in any particular State is unpredictable, by the United 
States is likely to experience a natural disaster almost every year. 
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that the functional 
totals underlying this concurrent resolution on the budget assume that the Congress 
should consider in the extension of the Budget Enforcement Act and in appropriations 
Acts— 
(1) provisions that budget for emergencies or that require emergency 
spending to be offset; 
(2) provisions that provide flexibility to meet emergency funding 
requirements associated with natural disasters; 
(3) Congress and the President should consider appropriating at least 
$5,000,000,000 every year to provide for natural disaster relief; and 
(4) Congress and the President should not designate any emergency 
spending for natural disaster relief until such amounts provided in regular 
appropriations are exhausted. 
 
D. FISCAL YEAR 1999 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET 
None 
 
E. FISCAL YEAR 2000 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET 
SEC. 206. EMERGENCY DESIGNATION POINT OF ORDER IN THE 
SENATE. 
(a) DESIGNATIONS.— 
(1) GUIDANCE.—In making a designation of a provision of legislation as 
an emergency requirement under section 251(b)(2)(A) or 252(e) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the 
committee report and any statement of managers accompanying that 
legislation shall analyze whether a proposed emergency requirement meets 
all the criteria in paragraph (2). 
(2) CRITERIA.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The criteria to be considered in determining 
whether a proposed expenditure or tax change is an emergency 
requirement are whether it is— 
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(i) necessary, essential, or vital (not merely useful or 
beneficial); 
(ii) sudden, quickly coming into being, and not building up 
over time; 
(iii) an urgent, pressing, and compelling need requiring 
immediate action; 
(iv) subject to subparagraph (B), unforeseen, unpredictable, 
and unanticipated; and 
(v) not permanent, temporary in nature. 
(B) UNFORESEEN.—An emergency that is part of an aggregate 
level of anticipated emergencies, particularly when normally 
estimated in advance, is not unforeseen. 
(3) JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO MEET CRITERIA.—If the 
proposed emergency requirement does not meet all the criteria set forth in 
paragraph (2), the committee report or the statement of managers, as the 
case may be, shall provide a written justification of why the requirement 
should be accorded emergency status. 
(b) POINT OF ORDER.—When the Senate is considering a bill, resolution, 
amendment, motion, or conference report, a point of order may be made by a 
Senator against an emergency designation in that measure and if the Presiding 
Officer sustains that point of order, that provision making such a designation shall 
be stricken from the measure and may not be offered as an amendment from the 
floor. 
(c) WAIVER AND APPEAL.—This section may be waived or suspended in the 
Senate only by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the members, duly chosen 
and sworn. An affirmative vote of three fifths of the Members of the Senate, duly 
chosen and sworn, shall be required in the Senate to sustain an appeal of the 
ruling of the Chair on a point of order raised under this section. 
(d) DEFINITION OF AN EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—A provision shall 
be considered an emergency designation if it designates any item an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
(e) FORM OF THE POINT OF ORDER.—A point of order under this subsection 
may be raised by a Senator as provided in section 313(e) of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974. 
(f) CONFERENCE REPORTS.—If a point of order is sustained under this section 
against a conference report the report shall be disposed of as provided in section 
313(d) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
(g) EXCEPTION FOR DEFENSE SPENDING.—Subsection (b) shall not apply 
against an emergency designation for a provision making discretionary 
appropriations in the defense category. 
(h) SUNSET.—This section shall expire on the adoption of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2001. 
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